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ABSTRACT
Mediation has been touted as the magic Band-Aid to solve end-of-life
conflicts. When families and health care providers clash at the end of life,
bioethicists and conflict theorists alike have seized upon mediation as the
perfect procedural balm. Dissonant values, tragic choices, and roiling grief
and loss would be confronted, managed, and soothed during the emotional
alchemy of the mediation process. But what is happening in a significant
subset of end-of-life disputes is not mediation as we traditionally understand
it. Mediation's allure stems from its promise to excavate underlying needs
and interests, identify common ground, and push disputants toward more
moderate, creative, and mutually satisfying outcomes. But in the growing
number of intractable medical futility cases, there is no movement to middle
ground. Rather, we have a conversation that leads to a predictable outcome.
The provider backs down, and the surrogate gets the treatment that she
wants.
Mediation's failure was inevitable. It cannot succeed in the shadow of
current health care decisions law that gives surrogates so much power. To
make mediation work for these cases, we must equalize bargaining power by
giving providers a clearly-defined statutory safe harbor to unilaterally refuse
requests for inappropriate treatment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Alex Barlow was diagnosed with a brain tumor when he was 17-years-
old. Alex and his family chose "an aggressive course of treatment involving
NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER & CAROL B. LIEBMAN, BIoETHIcs MEDIATION: A
GUIDE TO SHAPING SHARED SOLUTIONS 15 (United Hospital Fund of New York 2004);
Nancy Neveloff Dubler & Carol B. Liebman, Bioethics: Mediating Conflict in the
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surgery, radiation therapy, and chemotherapy." But despite these
interventions, Alex continued to deteriorate. For the past two months, "Alex
was intubated, unconscious, and unresponsive" with multiple organ failure
"secondary to the effects of the brain tumor, sepsis, and a chronic lung
infection."2
Given Alex's condition and prognosis, his health care team considered
further aggressive treatment to be medically inappropriate. But Alex's health
care agent, his sister, emphasized in repeated discussions with the team that
"she would never, under any circumstance, agree to any measure that would
shorten his life by even a moment." 3 This is a medical futility dispute.
A mediator was called to help the sister and the health care team reach
consensus. The mediator first explained that Alex would not be administered
any more platelets because they were, at that moment, a scarce resource and
other patients had a greater capacity to benefit from them. The sister agreed
that "Alex would not be eligible to receive platelets."4 The mediator next
explained that given the fragile nature of Alex's lungs and other systems,
there would be no way to resuscitate him from a cardiac arrest. The sister
also agreed to a DNR order. 5
Dubler and Liebman offer this narrative to help make "the case for
mediation." 6 But while the sister and the team reached agreement, the
Barlow case overstates the case for mediation of futility disputes. The case is
too limited to its peculiar facts.
Dubler and Liebman note that the mediator succeeds here by "plac[ing]
some constraints on the range of possible decisions" 7 and "making clear the
limits on care."8 With respect to the platelets, the mediator appeals to the
principle of "triage."9 With respect to the DNR order, she appeals to
Hospital Environment, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 32, 37 (2004).
2 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 15; Dubler & Liebman,'supra note 1, at 37.
3 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 17; Dubler & Liebman, supra note 1, at 38.
4 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 17; Dubler & Liebman, supra note 1, at 39.
5 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 18; Dubler & Liebman, supra note 1, at 39.
6 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 14; Dubler & Liebman, supra note 1, at 37.
7 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 17; Dubler & Liebman, supra note 1, at 38.
8 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 19.
9 Triage is the process of sorting people based on their need and chance of benefiting
from medical treatment. See generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY CERMINARA, THE RIGHT
TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING § 13.07 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2007)
[hereinafter THE RIGHT TO DIE]; STEVEN E. PEGALIS, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE § 6.18 (3d ed. 2005); JCAHO, MANAGING PATIENT FLOW: STRATEGIES
AND SOLUTIONS FOR ADDRESSING HOSPITAL OVERCROWDING 120-29 (2004). Cf Robert
A. Gatter & John C. Moskop, From Futility to Triage, 20 MED. & PHIL. 191 (1995)
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physiological futility. 10 These principles have a sound legal and ethical
basis."I But they are wholly inapplicable to the vast majority of futility
disputes in which the requested treatment is both available and potentially
efficacious. For these cases, mediation often cannot succeed.
End-of-life cases continue to bedevil us. 12 One study found that conflict
occurred in 78% of cases concerning the limitation of life-sustaining medical
treatment (LSMT). 13 While end-of-life cases initially involved a patient's
right to die with dignity, 14 they now typically involve, as with Alex Barlow,
a surrogate's claim for LSMT that her health care provider deems medically
inappropriate. 15 The leading treatise on the subject predicts that these
(arguing that the entire futility debate should be recast in terms of triage planning). While
triage is a well-recognized principle in medical care distribution, many ethics consultants
and committees would be wary of refusing families requesting scarce resources on the
grounds that such resources could be better utilized elsewhere. See infra notes 77-85 &
198-201 (discussing provider unwillingness to refuse treatment notwithstanding well-
grounded reasons to do so).
10 Physiologically futile interventions literally have no effect on the patient. See
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse
Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (reviewing the
literature).
11 Dubler and Liebman recognize that these principles are so well-grounded that the
sister's consent was not even required: "The mediation process did not change the
outcome in terms of what medical care would be given." DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note
1, at 19.
12 See John M. Luce & Douglas B. White, The Pressure to Withhold or Withdraw
Life-sustaining Therapy from Critically Ill Patients in the United States, 175 AM. J.
RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1104, 1104-07 (2007) ("[D]isagreements between
families and clinicians on end-of-life care are commonplace in the United States."); Keith
M. Swetz et al., Report of 255 Clinical Ethics Consultations and Review of the Literature,
82 MAYO CLIN. PROC. 686, 689-90 (2007) (finding that futility disputes are one of the
primary reasons for hospital ethics consultations).
13 Catherine M. Breen et al., Conflict Associated with Decisions to Limit Life-
Sustaining Treatment in Intensive Care Units, 16 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 283, 285
(2001). See also Julie Rosenbaum et al., Sources of Ethical Conflict in Medical House
Staff Training: A Qualitative Study, 116 AM. J. MED. 402 (2004) (describing a range of
end-of-life conflicts).
14 See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 9, at § 1.07; See also Thomas J. Murray &
Bruce Jennings, The Quest to Reform End of Life Care: Rethinking Assumptions and
Setting New Directions, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at S52.
15 One study found 974 futility disputes in sixteen hospitals over an average four-
year period. See Emily Ramshaw, Bills Challenge Limits for Terminal Patients: Some
Say 10 Days to Transfer Isn't Enough Before Treatment Ends, THE DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Feb. 15, 2007, at Al. If this sample is representative, then there may be tens of
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medical futility disputes are "likely to occupy as much, if not more [time
and] judicial effort in the coming years as conventional end-of-life cases
have in the last three decades." 16 We must attend to how these disputes are
resolved. 17
In the 1970s and 1980s, end-of-life disputes typically went to the
courts. 18 But courts were soon recognized to be ill-equipped to handle such
disputes. Among other problems, judicial review is cumbersome, an intrusion
on patient privacy, and an encroachment on the medical profession. 19 So,
instead of courts, end-of-life disputes started going to hospital ethics
committees. 20
Ethics committees' approaches to end-of-life disputes evolved over time.
Originally, ethics committees followed a diagnostic decisionmaking model in
which they identified the problem(s), gathered the facts, and suggested a
thousands of disputes nationwide. See American Hospital Association, Fast Facts on U.S.
Hospitals, http://www.aha.org/aha/resource-center/Statistics-and-Studies/fast-facts.html
(last visited Sept. 1, 2007) (stating that there are 5756 hospitals in the United States).
16 RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 9, at § 13.01[D]. See also Pam Belluck, Even as
Doctors Say Enough, Families Fight to Prolong Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at Al
("The most common case that comes before the ethics committees are families now
insisting on treatment that the doctors believe is unwarranted.") (quoting Dr. John J.
Paris).
17 Cf DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 8 ("As long as disparate values exist
within families, between patients, families, and the health care system, conflicts are
inevitable. And if conflicts are inevitable, strategies for managing them are required.").
18 See ALEXANDER M. CAPRON & IRWIN M. BIRNBAUM, TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE
LAW § 18.06 (2004).
19 See generally THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 9, at § 3.18; Robin F. Wilson,
Hospital Ethics Committees as the Forum of Last Resort: An Idea Whose Time Has Not
Come, 76 N.C. L. REV. 353, 359-66 (1998) (collecting the relevant literature before
questioning the conclusion that courts are an inferior forum). See also In re Rosebush,
491 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Mich. App. 1992) ("[T]he decision-making process should
generally occur in the clinical setting without resort to the courts.. ."); In re A.C., 573
A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (N.J. 1987) (resolving end-
of-life disputes through a judicial process will "take too long"); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647, 669 (N.J. 1976) ("[A] practice of applying to a court to confirm such decisions
would generally be inappropriate and a gratuitous encroachment upon the medical
profession."); I. Glenn Cohen, Negotiating in the Shadow of Death, DIsP. RESOL. MAG.,
Fall 2004, at 12, 12 (endorsing "a hands-off approach by courts" because of "a lack of
confidence in courts' abilities to deduce and apply legal principles to a complex mix of
emotion, culture and religion.").
20 See generally Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting
Rights in a Community of Caring, 50 MD. L. REV. 798 (1991); Wilson, supra note 19, at
364-66.
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solution. 21 According to this consultation model, the ethics committee acted
like an expert and supplied answers and recommendations.
But this model has changed. 22 Today, instead of acting as "decision-
makers or recommendation-makers" pursuant to a consultation model, ethics
committees more often operate according to a classic mediation model. 23
They see their task as choreographing a productive negotiation process rather
than as identifying a set solution. 24 Ethics committees' mission statements
direct them to be facilitative rather than directive and authoritarian. 25 A
21 See Mark P. Aulisio, Ethics Committees and Ethics Consultation, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 841, 841-44 (3d ed. 2004); 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 20.22 (3d ed. 2005); Diane E. Hoffmann, Mediating Life and
Death Decisions, 36 ARiz. L. REV. 821, 823 (1994); Kimberlee K. Kovach, Neonatology
Life and Death Decisions: Can Mediation Help? 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 251, 281 (2000).
22 See Mary Coombs, Schiavo: The Road Not Taken, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 547,
559 (2007) ("The directive ... approach is far less common"). A recent study suggests
that ethics committees may not have changed as much as thought. See Ellen Fox et al.,
Ethics Consultation in United States Hospitals: A National Survey, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS
13, 18 (2007) (reporting that 65% of hospitals made a recommendation in 100% of
cases).
23 See Margaret Urban Walker, Keeping Moral Spaces Open: New Images of Ethics
Consulting, 23 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 33 (noting a shift from
"content" expert to "process" expert, from "engineer" to "architect"). See also Dipanjan
Banerjee, Principles and Procedures of Medical Ethics Case Consultation, 68 BR. J.
HOSP. MED. 140, 141 (2007) ("Instead of imposing decisions ... the HEC ... instead
negotiate[s] a dialogue"); Jeanne Ten Broeck, Bioethics Mediation at the End of Life: An
Underused Model? in CONFLICT STUDIES: THE NEW GENERATION OF IDEAS: CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS 270, 271 (UMass-Boston 2006); 1 SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION:
LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE § 12.4 (2d ed. 2006); GRENIG, supra note 21, at § 20.22
("Because of dissatisfaction with their role as decision-makers, or recommendation-
makers, some hospital ethics committees are exploring the use of alternative dispute
resolution, particularly mediation, to resolve bioethical disputes."); Hoffman, supra note
21, at 824, 877; Martha Jurchak, Report of a Study to Examine the Process of Ethics Case
Consultation, 11 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 49, 52-53 (2000); Kovach, supra note 21, at 281.
24 See DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 14 ("Mediation is more inclusive and
empowering, and consultation is more authoritarian and hierarchical"). See also infra
notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., Wake Forest University Health Sciences, Main Ethics Committee By-
laws & Procedures, http://www.wfubmc.edu/bioethics/CommiteeStructure (last visited
Sept. 1, 2007) ("The role of the Ethics Committee will be educational, advisory, and
consultative."); University of Louisville Hospital, Overview of the Responsibilities of the
Hospital Ethics Committee, http://uoflhealthcare.org/Default.aspx?tabid=526 (last visited
Sept. 1, 2007) ("[T]he committee will provide advisory consultation . . . primary
responsibility will be to encourage dialogue, educate, identify issues offer viable
148
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successful committee intervention does not impose an answer, but rather
allows the parties to craft a "shared solution," taking their own interests and
needs into account. 26
Mediation looked like the magic Band-Aid to solve end-of-life
conflicts. 27 But if by mediation we mean a process in which both sides work
to find a creative solution that differs in some way from their initial starting
points, 28 then that is not happening in a significant subset of cases. Rather, in
the intractable futility cases disputant bargaining invariably leads to a
predictable outcome. Because mediation occurs in the shadow of health care
decisions law, which gives surrogates disproportionate power, providers
invariably back down and the surrogates get the treatment they want. 29
This is not what we hope for when we speak of mediation. It is really just
a one-sided negotiation in which surrogates are sure to prevail. 30 We should
stop pretending that what committees are doing when they intervene in
intractable futility cases is "real" mediation. Calling it mediation serves only
to mask the normative judgments implicit in the controlling substantive law
and delays much needed societal debate. Furthermore, urging providers to
invest in mediation to achieve mutually empowering win-win resolutions
leads to anger and disillusionment when they consistently lose. 31 And where
the law itself lacks transparency, so too may providers' conduct. 32
options").
26 See DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 8 ("Mediation . . . is a private,
voluntary, informal process in which an impartial third person facilitates a negotiation
between people in conflict and helps them find solutions that meet their interests and
needs.").
27 See infra notes 63-69.
28 See infra notes 70-77.
29 See infra notes 77-85 & 198-201 and accompanying text.
30 Providers and surrogates make most of these decisions, because "less than 5% of
patients are able to communicate... at the time." Jenny Way et al., Withdrawing Life
Support and Resolution of Conflict with Families, 325 B.M.J. 1342, 1342 (2002).
31 Cf. Catherine S. Meschievitz, Mediation and Medical Malpractice: Problems with
Definition and Implementation, 54 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS 195 (1991) (mediation is
supposed to empower the participants by giving them a voice); Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting
Mediations as a Representative of the System of Civil Justice, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
REsOL. 227, 249 (2007) ("[Tlwo of the animating purposes of mediation: to empower the
parties and to honor and facilitate their self-determination."); Robert A. Burt, Resolving
Disputes Between Clinicians and Families About 'Futility' of Treatment, 27 SEMINARS IN
PERINATOLOGY 495 (2003) (arguing that "grudging acquiescence" will not serve patients
well).
32 See Robert D. Orr, The Gilgunn Case: Courage and Questions, 14 J. INTENSIVE
CARE MED. 54, 56 (1999) ("All too often clinicians ... will surreptitiously agree and then
149
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While serious, lack of transparency is not the only problem. Simple
provider accession to surrogate demands is also a substantively undesirable
outcome. 33 We must consider what might be a better outcome for these cases
and what procedural mechanisms might best achieve that outcome. Since it is
neither necessary nor appropriate to employ all available technology to
sustain corporeal existence as long as possible, we must equalize bargaining
power by giving providers a clearly-defined statutory safe harbor to
unilaterally refuse requests for inappropriate treatment.
In Section Two, we describe a medical futility dispute as one where a
patient's surrogate demands LSMT that the patient's provider judges to be
inappropriate. In Section Three, we explain that while mediation has been
presented as the best mechanism for resolving medical futility disputes,
mediation has proven unable to resolve a significant and growing subset of
such cases. Surrogates tenaciously maintain their extreme starting positions
and providers acquiesce.
carry out a 'slow code,' a dishonest pretense of effort to show the family that 'everything
was done."'). Being unable to write a unilateral DNR order in situations that they deemed
inappropriate for CPR, providers were known to affix color dots to the patient's wristband
or write "N.T.B.R." (Not to Be Resuscitated) in pencil on the chart to be erased after the
patient died. Some providers did a "Hollywood Code" or "Show Code" in which they
performed a half-hearted or mock resuscitation. Elizabeth Rosenthal, Rules on Reviving
the Dying Bring Undue Suffering, Doctors Contend, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1990, at Al;
Marshall Kapp, Futile Medical Treatment: A Review of the Ethical Arguments and Legal
Holdings, 9 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 170, 173 (1994); George P. Smith II, Euphemistic
Codes and Tell-Tale Hearts: Humane Assistance in End-of-Life Cases, 10 HEALTH
MATRIX 175, 184 (2000). Still other providers performed "Slow Code[s]" in which they
moved "very slowly." Slow Codes, Show Codes and Death, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1987,
at A26; Cf David A. Asch et al., Decisions to Limit or Continue Life-Sustaining
Treatment by Critical Care Physicians in the United States: Conflict Between Physicians'
Practices and Patients' Wishes, 151 AM. J. RESPIRATORY CRITICAL CARE MED. 288, 292
(1995) ("Life-sustaining treatment is being withheld or withdrawn without the consent or
knowledge of patients or their surrogates."); Kathryn L. Tucker, The Death with Dignity
Movement: Protecting Rights and Expanding Options After Glucksberg and Quill, 82
MINN. L. REv. 923, 924 (1998) (arguing that since "a widespread underground practice of
physician-assisted [suicide] exists . . . the question is not really whether the practice
should occur, but whether the practice should proceed underground and unregulated, or
openly and regulated to protect patients"); Simon N. Whitney & Laurence B.
McCullough, Physicians' Silent Decisions: Because Patient Autonomy Does Not Always
Come First, 7 AM. J. BIOETHics 33 (2007).
33 See infra notes 216-235 and accompanying text.
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In Section Four, we explain that mediation's failure was inevitable. The
mediation of futility disputes occurs in the shadow of health care decisions
law that gives vastly more bargaining power to surrogates. Surrogates not
only have more invested in the outcome, but they are also more willing to
risk litigation to achieve that outcome. Providers, on the other hand, are risk-
averse, litigation-averse, and less invested in the outcome. Consequently,
surrogates are able to make extraordinary demands, knowing that providers
will accede.
We must stop asking mediation to do more work than it is structurally
equipped to handle. If we want "real" mediation then we must equalize the
bargaining power between providers and surrogates. In Section Four, we
defend giving providers a clearly-defined statutory safe harbor to unilaterally
refuse requests for inappropriate treatment.
II. BACKGROUND: WHAT IS A FUTILITY DISPUTE?
In a right-to-die situation, the patient or her surrogate wants to limit
LSMT but the health care provider resists. In a futility situation, the roles are
reversed. A medical futility dispute arises when a health care provider seeks
to stop treatment that the patient or surrogate wants continued. The health
care provider judges LSMT to be of no benefit and wants to "stop the train"
when the patient or surrogate says "keep going."34
The provider and surrogate disagree because they have different goals. 35
The surrogate's goals might include cure, amelioration of disability, palliation
of symptoms, reversal of disease process, or prolongation of life. The
provider, on the other hand, might, under the circumstances, judge these
goals to be impossible, virtually impossible, or otherwise inappropriate. 36 It
was just this sort of disagreement underlying the recent high-profile case of
Baby Emilio.
Emilio Lee Gonzales was born generally healthy on November 3, 2005,
but within a few weeks he started exhibiting some neurological
abnormalities. 37 By November 2006, Emilio showed "global developmental
34 K. Francis Lee, Postoperative Futile Care: Stopping the Train When the Family
Says "Keep Going," 15 THORACIC SURGERY CLINICS 481, 481 (2005).
35 See Griffin Trotter, Editorial Introduction: Futility in the 21t Century, 19 HEC
FORUM 1, 1 (2007); Thomas Mayo, Health Care Law, 53 SMU L. REv. 1101, 1110 n.78
(2000) ("[T]he core dispute is... over what constitutes a 'benefit' to the patient... ").
36 See Pope, supra note 10 (reviewing physiological futility, quantitative futility, and
four versions of qualitative futility).
37 Verified Complaint at Ex. B to Ex. 1, Gonzales v. Seton Family of Hospitals, No.
A07CA267 (W.D. Tex. filed Apr. 4, 2007).
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delay and decreased muscle tone and reflexes," and was soon diagnosed with
Leigh's disease, a progressive neuron-metabolic disorder which affects the
nervous system.38 In December 2006, Emilio was admitted to the PICU at
Children's Hospital of Austin where his neurological status continued to
worsen as his brain atrophied. 39 He was dependent on a mechanical
ventilator for breathing and a nasojejunal tube for eating.40 He was semi-
comatose, unable to move his arms or legs, or empty his bladder. He was
having frequent seizures and providers had "great difficulty keeping his lungs
inflated." 41
Emilio's health care providers determined that his condition was
irreversible and that continued treatment would only "serve to prolong his
suffering without the possibility of cure." 42 They felt that "the burdens
associated with his current care plan outweigh[ed] any benefit Emilio [might
have been] receiving" 43 and that his "aggressive treatment plan amount[ed]
to a nearly constant assault on Emilio's fundamental human dignity."
44
But Emilio's mother, Catarina, demanded that providers continue the
aggressive treatment plan. She refused to consent to the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment for Emilio,45 insisting that Emilio's providers maintain
him until "Jesus takes him."46 Catarina would not agree to the providers'
recommendations because "every moment of life he has to spend with her is
of inestimable value." 47
During the winter of 2007, Emilio's providers and his mother had
multiple conferences to discuss his condition and treatment plan, 48 but they
could not reach any consensus. In both February and March of 2007,
Catarina met not only with Emilio's providers but also with the hospital's
entire Neonatal/Pediatric Ethics Committee. Again, no consensus could be
reached. 49 Soon thereafter, Catarina filed two separate lawsuits against both
38 Id. at 17.
39 Id. at Ex. B to Ex. 1.
40 Id.
41 Id. at Ex. D to Ex. 1, at 3.
42 Id. at Ex. A to Ex. 1.
43 Complaint, supra note 37, at Ex. D to Ex. 1, at 4.
44Id.
4 5 Id. at 19.
4 6 Id. at Ex. B to Ex. 1, at 3.
4 7 Id. at [27.
48 Id. at Ex. B to Ex. 1, at 2.
49 Complaint, supra note 37, at Ex. D to Ex. 1.
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the Children's Hospital and individual providers. 50 While these suits were
pending, clinical staff continued to provide the treatment that they considered
medically inappropriate until May 20, 2007, when Emilio died.5 1
While the Gonzales case ended up in the courts, most futility disputes are
resolved internally and informally by the health care team. After the team
discusses the patient's goals for treatment, the nature of the patient's
condition, and the range of options, most surrogates agree with the team's
recommendation. For example, in a multi-center study by Prendergast and
colleagues, 57% of surrogates agreed immediately with a provider-
recommended care-plan, and 90% moved toward agreement within five
days. 52 In a more recent study, Garros and colleagues found that consensus
was reached in 51% of cases after the first meeting, in 69% of cases after a
second meeting, and in 97% of cases after a third meeting.53
But a significant and growing number of cases are not resolved even
after multiple and extended discussions between families and the health care
team. In. Prendergast's study, 4% of surrogates continued to insist that
treatment be continued. 54 In Garros' study, 2% of surrogates insisted. 55 An
even broader study shows 7% of disputes were incapable of resolution. 56
Moreover, the rate of irreconcilability appears to be on the rise.57
50 Gonzales v. Seton Family of Hospitals, No. 86427 (Travis Cty. Probate Ct, Tex.
filed Mar. 20, 2007); Gonzales v. Seton Family of Hospitals, No. A07CA267 (W.D. Tex.
filed Apr. 4, 2007).
51 Eric Dexheimer, Mother Who Fought to Continue Son's Treatment Cradles 19-
Month-Old at End, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 20, 2007.
52 Thomas J. Prendergast et al., A National Survey of End-of-Life Care for Critically
Ill Patients, 158 AM. J. RESPIRATORY CRIT. CARE MED. 1163, 1165 (1998); see also
Thomas J. Prendergast, Resolving Conflicts Surrounding End-of-Life Care, 5 NEW
HORIZONS 62, 67 (1997).
53 Daniel Garros et al., Circumstances Surrounding End of Life in a Pediatric
Intensive Care Unit, 112 PEDIATRICS e371, e372 (2003). See also Laurence J.
Schneiderman et al., Effect of Ethics Consultations on Nonbeneficial Life-sustaining
Treatments in the Intensive Care Setting: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 290 JAMA
1166 (2003) (concluding that ethics consults were useful in resolving conflicts that may
have inappropriately prolonged nonbeneficial treatments).
54 Prendergast, A National Survey, supra note 52, at 1165; see also Prendergast,
Resolving Conflicts, supra note 52, at 67.
55 Garros, supra note 53, at e373.
56 H. Comm. Pub. Health, Tex. H.R., Interim Report 2006, at 36 (citing written
testimony of Greg Hooser).
57 Surrogates are increasingly likely to make demands for inappropriate LSMT. See
infra notes 97-128. Providers, on the other hand, are increasingly likely to resist such
demands. Today, some physicians do not challenge surrogate demands. Either they have
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In these intractable cases, where the health care team is unable to
convince the surrogate, the team typically employs an individual (or team
of) 58 consultant(s) or mediator(s) to help negotiate an agreement between the
physician and the surrogate. 59 At this point, however, mediation often has
nothing to offer.
difficulty talking with surrogates about end-of-life care or they are compensated to
perform the requested procedures. Cf PAULINE W. CHEN, FINAL EXAM: A SURGEON'S
REFLECTIONS ON MORTALITY (2007); Murray & Jennings, supra note 14, at S54; Norman
Paradis, Making a Living Off the Dying, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1992, at 15; Prendergast,
Resolving Conflicts, supra note 52, at 63. Yet, a recent greater emphasis on palliative care
and improved communication, and shifting reimbursement incentives may change this
behavior. See The EPEC Project: Education in Palliative and End-of-Life Care,
available at www.epec.net (last visited Sept. 1, 2007); Joanne Kenen, A New Focus on
Easing the Pain: Palliative Care Helps The Very Ill. It May Also Keep Costs Down,
WASH. POST, July 3, 2007; Ronald Schonwetter, Palliative Medicine Coming of Age, 10
J. PALLIATIVE MED. 3 (2007); Judy Fortin, Class Trains Doctors for the Toughest
Conversations, CNN, Apr. 23, 2007, www.cnn.com. See also Ronald Bailey, Pulling the
Plug on Unwilling Patients: Should the High Cost of Living Affect Your Chances of
Dying? REASONONLINE, Feb. 10, 2006, www.reasononline.com ("[I]t is clear that in the
real world of limited medical resources that the 'authorities,' whether private or
governmental, will unavoidably be making similar life and death decisions in the
future."); Eric Gampel, Does Professional Autonomy Protect Medical Futility
Judgments? 20 BIOETHICS 92, 98 (2006) (predicting "managerial pressures on HCPs to
use and extend the category of futility... "); MARK HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI, &
DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 3 (5th ed. 2003) ("The Baby K
situation may become more typical as a result of greater pressure on physicians to limit
medical costs."); Liz Kowalczyk, Mortal Differences Divide Hospital and Patient's
Family, BOST. GLOBE, Sept. 28, 2003, at Al; JOAN M. KRAUSKOPF ET AL., ELDERLAW:
ADVOCACY FOR THE AGING § 13.26 (2005); Donald J. Murphy, The Economics of Futile
Interventions, in MEDICAL FUTILITY AND THE EVALUATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING
INTERVENTIONS 123 (Marjorie B. Zucker & Howard D. Zucker eds., 1997); THE RIGHT
TO DIE, supra note 9, § 13.01 [C] & § 13.09; Ann Wlazelek, Hospital Procedures Made
Clear at Women's Expense, KANSAS CITY STAR, June 12, 2004.
58 In addition to individual consultants, sometimes teams (groups of three) or entire
committees are brought in to "mediate" between provider and surrogate. See Banerjee,
supra note 23, at 141-42 (reviewing the major advantages and disadvantages of each
model); DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 35-45; Linda Farber Post, Clinical
Consulting: The Search for Resolution at the Intersection of Medicine, Law, and Ethics,
14 HEC F. 338, 342 (2003); Cynda Rushton et al., Ethics Consultation: Individual, Team,
or Committee, in ETHICS CONSULTATIONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 88 (Mark P.
Aulisio et al. eds., 2003).
59 This "staged" approach to dispute resolution is common to both model standards
and institutional policies. See, e.g., Susan Carhart, Process Approach to End-of-Life Care
Fails to Eliminate Ethical, Political Issues, 11 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1755 (2002);
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Many cases remain unresolved. And even those that are resolved are not
concluded in the fashion that mediation typically contemplates. The
negotiation process consists in the main of surrogate intransigence and
provider capitulation. To assign the term "mediation" to a process that
consistently facilitates the predictable, unconditional surrender of one side
entails a serious distortion of our ADR vocabulary. Mediation is not working
in these intractable end-of-life disputes and we should stop pretending that it
is.
III. PROBLEM: WHILE WIDELY ESPOUSED, MEDIATION'
DOES NOT RESOLVE MANY FUTILITY DISPUTES
By helping parties to "generate, explore, and exchange information and
options," 60 mediation is supposed to generate creative solutions and push
parties toward middle ground. 61 Since the parties "have to build a solution
from their own understandings and needs . . . it is characteristic of good
mediation that the outcome can never be seen in advance of the process." 62
This typically does not happen in a significant and growing set of futility
disputes. The outcome of these cases is predictable. No options are
generated, and there is no movement to middle ground. Instead, surrogates
cling to their initial starting positions and providers eventually acquiesce.
CENTER FOR PRACTICAL BIOETHICS, RECOMMENDED POLICY GUIDELINES REGARDING
MEDICAL FUTILITY 17-20 (2006); HEALTH COUNCIL OF SOUTH FLORIDA, MEDICAL
FUTILITY GUIDELINES OF SOUTH FLORIDA 28 (2000); Gay Moldow et al., Why Address
Medical Futility Now?, MINN. MED., June 2004, at 38; NATIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEE OF
THE VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, Do-NOT-RESUSCITATE ORDERS AND MEDICAL
FUTILITY 7-8 (2000); Peter A. Singer et al., Hospital Policy on Appropriate Use of Life-
Sustaining Treatment, 29 CRITICAL CARE MED. 187, 190-91 (2001); S.Y. Tan et al.,
Creating a Medical Futility Policy, HEALTH PROGRESS, July-Aug. 2003.
60 Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Conflict and Consensus at the End of Life, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at S19, S24-S25. See also DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra
note 1, at 9 ("The mediator works with the parties, helping them identify their goals and
priorities, generate and explore options, and exchange information that may be necessary
for formulating a solution.").
61 LEONARD J. MARCUS, RENEGOTIATING: HEALTH CARE RESOLVING CONFLICT TO
BUILD COLLABORATION 344 (Jossey Bass Publishers 1995).
62 Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia Were a Mediator: An Inquiry into
Justice in Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 157, 182 (2003).
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A. Mediation Has Been Widely Promoted as the Best Mechanism for
Resolving End-of-Life Disputes
Mediation has been widely espoused as the best mechanism for resolving
end-of-life treatment disputes. Such an approach is endorsed by the
American Society for Bioethics and Humanities' (ASBH) influential report
Core Competencies for Health Care Ethics Consultation,63 and enthusiastic
encouragement for mediation appears in medical journals, 64 law reviews, 65
and bioethical literature.66
In 1999, the American Medical Association Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs published an influential report, emphasizing a fair process
63 AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR BIOETHICS AND HUMANITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES FOR
HEALTH CARE ETHICS CONSULTATION 6 (1998).
64 See, e.g., Mark Aulisio et al., Ethical and Palliative Care Consultation in the
ICU, 20 CRIT. CARE CLINICS 505 (2004); M. Gregg Bloche, Managing Conflict at the
End of Life, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2371 (2005); LeAnna M. DeAngelo, Mediation in
Health Care Settings: Some Theoretical and Practical Concepts, 7 J. CLINICAL PSYCH.
MED. SETTINGS 133 (2000); Michael D. Fetters et al., Conflict Resolution at the End of
Life, 29 CRIT. CARE MED. 921, 924 (2001); Prendergast, Resolving Conflicts, supra note
52, at 62; Singer et al., supra note 59, at 188.
65 See, e.g., Chad Bowman, Dispute Over End-of-Life Care Treated Increasingly
with Mediation, 9 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1527 (Oct. 5, 2000); Broeck, supra note 23, at
273; Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Heroic Care Cases: When Difficult Decisions About Care
Are Near, Mediation Can Help Bridge Communication Gap, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring
1999, at 7; Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of Life: Mediating End-of-
Life Treatment Disputes to Prevent Erosion of Patient-Physician Relationship, 79 B.U. L.
REV. 1091 (1999); Debra Gerardi & Jacqueline N. Font-Guzman, A Growing Need for
Dispute Resolution Practices, CREIGHTON LAWYER, Fall 2006, at 34-38; Thomas L.
Hafemeister, End-of-Life Decision Making, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Preventative
Law: Hierarchical v. Consensus-Based Decision-Making Model, 41 ARIZ. L. REv. 329
(1999); Hoffman, supra note 21, at 876; Kovach, supra note 21, at 252, 283-84; Leonard
Marcus, A Culture of Conflict: Lessons from Renegotiating Health Care, 5 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL'Y 447, 456 (2002).
66 See, e.g., Autumn Feister, The Failure of the Consult Model: Why 'Mediation'
Should Replace 'Consultation,' 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 31, 32 (2007); NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, CRITICAL CARE DECISIONS IN FETAL AND NEONATAL MEDICINE § 8.58 (2006);
Mary Beth West & Jean Mclver Gibson, Facilitating Medical Ethics Case Review: What
Ethics Committees Can Learn from Mediation and Facilitation Techniques, 1
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 63 (1992), reprinted in BIOETHICS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICE 293, 294-95 (Nancy S. Jecker
et al. eds., 1997); Walker, supra note 23, at 33.
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mechanism for resolving futility disputes. Specifically, the AMA
recommended that if the health care team cannot resolve a dispute, then:
[T]he assistance of an individual consultant.., is often helpful to reach
resolution within all parties' acceptable limits. The role of the individual
consultant is not to single-handedly resolve the conflict but rather to
facilitate discussions that would reach that end. 67
Position statements and model policies of other professional medical
associations similarly endorse mediation. 68
Moreover, mediation's popularity is not rhetorical only; it has been
implemented as an end-of-life dispute resolution mechanism throughout the
United States. A nationwide survey of how hospitals resolve futility disputes
found that virtually all hospital futility policies "envisioned a primarily
consultative, consensus building approach. '' 69
Nancy Dubler explains that the role of a bioethics mediator "is not to
make the decision but rather to explore the various options.., to see whether
all can reach a consensus about the best care plan for the patient." 70 The
mediator "facilitates a discussion between and among the parties to the
conflict," helping the parties "to identify their goals and priorities and to
generate, explore, and exchange information and options." 71
67 AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Medical Futility in End-of-Life
Care, 281 JAMA 937, 940 (1999) (emphasis added). See also AMA CouNCIL ON
ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS §§ 2.035, 2.037, at 13-15
(2006-07 ed.).
68 See, e.g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Committee
Opinion: Opinion No. 362: Medical Futility, 109 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 791
(2007) [hereinafter ACOG]; American Thoracic Society, Withholding and Withdrawing
Life-Sustaining Therapy, 144 AM. REv. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 726 (1991); BRITISH
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, WITHHOLDING AND WITHDRAWING LIFE-PROLONGING MEDICAL
TREATMENT (2d ed. 2001); Society of Critical Care Medicine Ethics Committee,
Consensus Statement Regarding Futile and Other Possibly Inadvisable Treatments, 25
CRITICAL CARE MED. 887 (1997).
69 Sandra H. Johnson et al., Legal and Institutional Policy Responses to Medical
Futility, 30 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 21, 31 (1997).
70 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 4, 9 (A mediator does not "decide who is
right and who is wrong or impose solutions on the parties."); Mark P. Aulisio et al., supra
note 64, at 514 (While the mediator helps "facilitate an ethically acceptable resolution of
the issue preferably through the building of consensus," the "'involved parties' ... remain
the primary decision makers.").
71 Dubler, supra note 60, at S24-S25. See also Aulisio et al., supra note 64, at 514
("The consultant elicits questions and uncertainties, helps to clarify factual information..
• helps health care providers and family think through the situation and the values at
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Dubler explains that for futility disputes, "mediation can provide a
process to assist in the formation of a care plan that meets [both] the needs of
the patient and family and respects professional commitments. '' 72 The end-
of-life dispute mediator, acting as a process guide, gives patients and
providers the space to communicate their concerns and work together so they
will reach a mutually agreeable resolution to their dispute. 73
Accordingly, mediation is supposed to move parties from position-based
to interest-based negotiation. 74 Mediation is supposed to build options and
generate a new set of choices. 75 In short, mediation is supposed to catalyze
creative solutions, guide people toward settlements that satisfy their
underlying interests, and generate resolutions that are distributed over a wide
range of outcomes. 76
B. Mediation Fails to Resolve Many Futility Disputes
However, none of this actually ever happens with respect to a small but
significant set of cases. These futility disputes remain immune to mediation's
charms. Mutually-endorsed, interest-based solutions remain elusive.
Extremism does not, in the crucible of conversation, give way to
moderation. 77 And creative solutions hardly ever emerge. Instead, the
stake."); Richard M. Zaner, A Comment on Community Consultation, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS
29, 30 (2007) (Mediators "help individuals whose situation it is think through their
circumstances as thoroughly as possible").
72 Dubler, .supra note 60, at S25. See also Nancy Dubler, Limiting Technology in the
Process of Negotiating Death, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 297, 298-99 (2001)
("[T]echniques of mediation ... set the stage, level the playing field, invite discussion,
identify positions, and seek consensus among conflicting conceptions of a good care
plan" ).
73 See Jerry P. Roscoe & Dierdre McCarthy Gallagher, Mediating Bioethical
Disputes, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2003, at 21, 22.
74 See DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 9 (citing ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM
URY, GETTING TO YES (1981)).
75 See MARCUS, supra note 61, at 344 (discussing "option building" and generating
"a new set of choices"); Ruth D. Raisfeld, Mediators Can Best Help Those Who Help
Themselves, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 2003 ("The goal in mediation is not to 'win,' but to come to
an agreement that both sides can live with.").
76 See CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER, & LELA P. LOVE,
MEDIATION: PRACTICE, POLICY AND ETHICS 95 (2005).
77 See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text. Of course, if the health care team
had poor communication with the surrogate, that leaves the mediator room to correct
those errors. In such cases, mediation will more likely be successful. For example, in the
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negotiation leads to a predictable outcome. Surrogates adhere to their
extreme starting positions, and they seldom come to think more realistically
about possible solutions. Providers explain how medically devastated the
patient is. Surrogates reassert their positions. Providers back down, and the
patient gets the treatment that the surrogates want.78
While health care decision statutes authorize health care providers to
refuse compliance with inappropriate treatment requests, 79 providers in these
jurisdictions reluctantly continue to accede with such requests. Even Dubler
and Liebman admit that since surrogates are empowered in futility disputes,
"the vast majority of hospitals require consent from the patient or family to
discontinue even futile treatment." 80 Although many health care institutions
would like to have futility policies, few actually do.81
Dubler and Liebman's "Davidoff' case, the team never made the patient's condition clear.
DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 3 (The patient's wife "was never told directly that
his survival would be unprecedented, and so it is not surprising that she continued to
demand that 'everything be done."'). Mediation worked in that case because the mediator
corrected the surrogate's misunderstanding. See Leslie H. Youssef, The Art of Resolving
Complex Health Care Disputes, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1145 (2004). Some
studies report high resolution rates from bioethics consultations. See, e.g., Aulisio et al.,
supra note 64, at 510-11 (reviewing several studies); David Casarett & Mark Siegler,
Unilateral Do-Not-Attempt-Resuscitation Orders in Ethics and Consultation, 27 CRIT.
CARE MED. 1116 (1999) (ethics consultants resolved disputes in 17 of 31 cases). But
"[t]he process and content of these consultations is not described, making it unclear
exactly what the consultation offered." Aulisio et al., supra note 64, at 511. Mediation is
more successful when offered earlier by "promoting regular communication" between the
surrogate and provider. Id. at 511-12; see also Nancy Dubler, The Limits of Dispute
Resolution: Commentary, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 11 ("Mediation is
particularly helpful ... when the process is triggered at an early stage of the conflict").
But even when optimally deployed, mediation still cannot resolve a significant subset of
futility disputes. Cf Dubler, supra note 60, at S25 ("Not all cases can be mediated.");
DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 5, 12 ("Mediation does not always succeed.").
78 See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 65, at 1527 ("[D]octors and hospitals will cave");
Stanley A. Nasraway, Unilateral Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment: Is It Time?
Are We Ready? 29 CRIT. CARE MED. 215, 216 (2001) ("It is much more common ... to
acquiesce to unreasonable demands").
79 See infra notes 174-186 and accompanying text.
80 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 26.
81 See Bowman, supra note 65, at 1528 ("'A lot of people want to have policies, but
a lot of people don't [have them]."') (quoting Shirley J. Paine); Ronald Cranford, Email to
Thad Pope, July 11, 2004 ("Many hospital lawyers, much more concerned about legal
liability and adverse publicity for their institutions, have been extremely tentative, if not
outright hostile, to ethics committees formulating and implementing futility policies, even
though many of us in the field of clinical ethics feel these guidelines are badly needed.");
John Fletcher, The Baby K Case: Ethical and Legal Considerations of Disputes about
159
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Even those institutions that have futility policies either are not
implementing them or are implementing them very narrowly and
infrequently. 82 For example, a health care provider in an institution with a
Futility, 2 BIOLAW: A LEGAL AND ETHICAL REPORTER ON MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE AND
BIOENGINEERING S.219, S.229 (1994) ("On coming to the University of Virginia in 1987,
I observed many clinicians overtreating hopelessly ill patients primarily due to fears of
legal liability. Also, clinicians were acutely aware of the lack of legal backing if they
refused to acquiesce"); Moldow et al., supra note 59, at 39 ("Fear of legal action has
previously discouraged many institutions from adopting policies in the area of medical
futility"); Nasraway, supra note 78, at 216 ("It is much more common for hospital
lawyers to argue in favor of doing the easy thing, i.e. to acquiesce to unreasonable
demands"); LAWRENCE J. SCHNEIDERMAN & NANCY S. JECKER, WRONG MEDICINE:
DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND FUrILE TREATMENT 32 (1995) [hereinafter WRONG MEDICINE];
Benjamin Weiser, The Case of Baby Rena: A Question of Letting Go, Wash. Post, July
14, 1991 (describing how physicians' "attempts to discuss unilateral action had fallen
flat"). Cf. Lisa Anderson-Shaw et al., The Fiction of Futility: What to Do with Policy?, 17
HEC FORUM 294, 299 (2005) ("Absent state or federal statutes specifically guiding futile
care activity, many institutions work under a much more informal approach to futile
care. ").
82 See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 65, at 1527 ("While physicians sometimes disagree
with patients or their surrogates over end-of-life care, however, they rarely end care in
violation of patient wishes."); Jeffrey Bums, Does Anyone Actually Enforce their
Hospital's Futility Policy?, LAHEY CLINIC MED. ETHICS J., Fall 2005 ("Despite an
increasing number of ethics consults on questions of futility, we do not invoke our own
futility policy."); Fletcher, supra note 81, at S.230 (noting a "moratorium" on the use of
UVA's policy after Baby K); Alan Meisel & Bruce Jennings, Ethics, End-of-Life Care,
and the Law: Overview, in LIVING WITH GRIEF: ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND END-OF-LIFE
CARE 63, 76 (2005) ("The standard operating procedure in most health care institutions
seems to be to accede to the surrogate's demands for treatment if the surrogate cannot be
convinced"); Wlazelek, supra note 57 (reporting that Lehigh Valley Hospital-
Muuhlenberg in Bethlehem, PA has a unilateral decision policy. Nevertheless, the option
to refuse treatment "takes courage on the part of the physician because he or she will
most likely be sued. No doctor at LVH has refused to treat a patient ... but some patients
have been transferred to other facilities."). See also Robert Fine et al., Medical Futility in
the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit: Hope for a Resolution, 116 PEDIATRICS 1219, 1221
(2005) (describing that before the Texas statute, "[in -80% of [futility] cases, consultants
were able to persuade families ... However, in the other 20% of cases, families insisted
on continued [LSMT], and physicians complied, being unwilling to subject themselves to
legal jeopardy by overruling the family/surrogate.");, Robert L. Fine & Thomas Wm.
Mayo, Resolution of Futility by Due Process: Early Experience with the Texas Advance
Directives Act, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 743, 744 (2003) ("It is unclear how effective
such guidelines could be in the face of legal uncertainty."). Even when ethics committees
agreed that treatment was futile, treating physicians were generally unwilling to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment. Amir Halevy & Amy McGuire, The History, Successes and
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multi-stage futility policy may invoke that policy in an attempt to resolve a
dispute. But should the dispute prove intractable, the provider will likely be
reluctant to go to the final stage and invoke any unilateral decision provisions
of the policy. Instead, the provider will ultimately assent to the surrogate's
treatment request. "If you're still at an impasse, the hospital continues to
provide maximum support." 83 In short, providers virtually always defer when
the dispute proves intractable. 84
Mediation fails in these cases. There is no agreement, only capitulation
under coercion. 85
Controversies of the Texas "Futility" Policy, Hous. LAW., May-June 2006, at 38, 38 ("In
spite of its adoption as hospital policy. . . no cases went through the entire process ....
The most likely explanation is that residual legal uncertainty regarding the policy still
lingered."); Terese Hudson & Kevin Lumsdon, Are Futile Care Policies the Answer?
Providers Struggle with Decisions for Patients Near the End of Life, 68 HOSPITALS &
HEALTH NETWORKS, Feb. 20, 1994, at 26, 27; Arthur U. Rivin, Futile Care Policy -
Lessons Learned from Three Years' Experience in a Community Hospital, 166 WEST. J.
MED. 389, 391 (1997) ("Despite the recommendations of the physicians and the ethics
committee, [Santa Monica] hospital refused to discontinue life support for fear of
lawsuit."); Amy V. Schlotzhauer & Bryan A. Liang, Definitions of Death, in HEALTH
LAW & POLICY: A SURVIVAL GUIDE TO MEDICOLEGAL ISSUES FOR PRACTITIONERS 287,
291 (Bryan A. Liang ed., Butterworth Heinemann 2000) ("[Njothing can be done in cases
where families of PVS patients seek to continue treatment indefinitely"); Louise Swig et
al., Physician Responses to a Hospital Policy Allowing Them to Not Offer CPR, 44 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1215, 1218 (1996) ("[D]espite a policy that allowed them to do
otherwise . . .physicians at San Francisco General Hospital usually offered CPR to
patients they thought were unlikely to benefit.").
83 Bowman, supra note 65, at 1527 (quoting Thomas Mayo).
84 See Jeffrey P. Burns & Cynda Hylton Rushton, End-of-Life Care in the Pediatric
Intensive Care Unit: Research Review and Recommendations, 20 CRIT. CARE CLINICS
467, 470 (2004) (reporting 93% of physicians continue to provide requested therapy they
think is futile); see also Laurence J. Schneiderman & Alexander Morgan Capron, How
Can Hospital Futility Policies Contribute to Establishing Standards of Practice?, 9
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 524, 525-26 (2000) (reporting a survey of
California hospital representatives in which "almost all acknowledged that their own
hospital would probably yield to demands for life-sustaining treatment").
85 Mediation works where "both parties are willing participants." Cf Randolph H.
Freking, Advocacy in Mediation: A Plaintiff Attorney's Perspective, in How ADR WORKS
339, 340 n.1 (Norman Brand ed., 2002); ELIZABETH S. PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA,
ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES
& LAWYERS 158 (1996). Here, providers are coerced no less than a party "ordered" to
mediate a dispute. While the external pressure to reach an agreement comes from the
social context of the provider-patient relationship instead of from a court, the pressure is
substantial. Hyman and Love argue that parties unaware of their rights in substantive law
lack self-determination. See Hyman & Love, supra note 62, at 163 n.9. Here, providers
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IV. ANALYSIS: MEDIATION CANNOT SUCCEED IN THE SHADOW OF
CURRENT HEALTH CARE DECISIONS LAW
"Negotiation is shaped by power. In the give-and-take of negotiation, the
more power people have, the less they must give. Conversely, the less power
people have, the more they must give." 86 Bargaining power, in turn, depends
primarily on the degree to which one is able to achieve one's goals outside
the mediation.87 Bargaining power is largely shaped by a party's best
alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) - the course of action
available if the current negotiations fail and an agreement cannot be
reached. 88
While surrogates are typically the weaker party in bioethics mediation, 89
they are the stronger party in futility disputes. 90 Professor Gifford observes
lack not information but the other component of self-determination: voluntariness.
86 MARCUS, supra note 61, at 45.
87 See DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 67
(1989) (BATNA is the most important source of power).
88 Your BATNA is the best situation you could achieve through external channels
and should establish your bottom line in the negotiation. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM
URY, GETTING TO YES 100 (2d ed. 1991); see also DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at
38; GIFFORD, supra note 87, at 50-54; MARCUS, supra note 61, at 294 ("Your BATNA
determines the point at which you walk from the negotiation table... Ideally when you
invoke your BATNA you have a better option than sticking around").
89 See DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 25; see also id. at 11 ("The power
imbalance in a hospital setting comes from many sources: the difference in level of
knowledge and expertise between most patients and the treatment team, the highly
technical and unfamiliar physical setting... The physical and emotional stress of serious
illness also contributes to an uneven playing field."); Dubler & Liebman, supra note 1, at
36.
90 See Robert A. Burt, The Medical Futility Debate: Patient Choice, Physician
Obligation, and End-of-Life Care, 5 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 249, 254 (2002) (observing that
while "it frequently appears to everyone that physicians hold all the trump cards[,]"
patient self determination and the legal system play a strong "counter-balancing role");
Dubler, supra note 77, at 11 (noting that in a futility dispute "the family member... has
all of the cards ... and is ready to play them to her advantage"); DUBLER & LIEBMAN,
supra note 1, at 25-26 (arguing that the centrality of patient/surrogate consent in the care
process balances an otherwise uneven playing field); E. Haavi Morreim, Profoundly
Diminished Life: The Casualties of Coercion, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb.
1994, at 33, 38 (showing that because "a physician faces legal risks," it is "very difficult
for him to avoid being coerced by insistent families."); Lawrence J. Schneiderman &
Jerry E. Fein, The Limits of Dispute Resolution: Commentary, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
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that the extent of a party's power depends on the alternatives it has if no
agreement is reached. 91 Here, the cost of disagreement to surrogates is less
onerous than the cost of non-concurrence to providers. 92 A provider's non-
settlement alternatives are worse than a surrogate's.
. Indeed, providers have such poor options that surrogates have leverage to
dictate the terms of an agreement. 93 Surrogates can effectively direct the
outcome of futility disputes. Since they have more power, they do not need to
make significant (or any) concessions. Providers, on the other hand, have
little power and must consequently give ground to avoid escalating the
conflict.
There are three primary sources of surrogates' bargaining power. First,
their passionate conviction in the "justness of their cause" serves as a strong
power lever. It feeds their intransigence, forcing provider concessions.
94
Second, surrogates are empowered by the misperception that the substantive
law is on their side. This misperception leads surrogates to an inflated notion
of their BATNA, which spurs them to ever more aggressive negotiating
strategies. 95 Third, even apart from this misperception, surrogates are more
willing to risk litigation. The ambiguity and confusion surrounding existing
legal norms adds a further layer of complexity to the always difficult task of
predicting litigation outcomes. Because providers are extremely averse both
to risk and to litigation itself, this normative uncertainty pushes in favor of
surrogates. 9
6
A. Mediation Fails Because Surrogates'Passion for Continued
Treatment Is Intransigent
Surrogates are empowered by their own sheer intransigence. 97 "They
Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 10, 11 (While some "invariably locate the greater power in the doctor
who 'trumps' the legitimate interests of the patient ... the weight of power may lie on the
opposite side.").
91 GIFFORD, supra note 87, at 36.
92 See id. See also CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND
SETTLEMENT § 4.01[3][d] (5th ed. 2005).
93 See GIFFORD, supra note 87, at 36 ("If a party has no viable options, the other
party has leverage to dictate terms").
94 See infra notes 97-136 and accompanying text.
95 See infra notes 137-166 and accompanying text.
96 See infra notes 167-214 and accompanying text.
97 See generally GIFFORD, supra note 87, at 67 (while BATNA is the most important
source of power, a party's level of commitment to the matter is also a strong determinant
of power); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES
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exude an uncompromising attitude that is intended to make [providers]
believe that no further progress can be achieved if [providers] do not modify
their current positions. '98 In other words, surrogates are able to convince
providers that they must make appropriate concessions if the discussions are
to continue. 99
Recent evidence suggests that surrogates are increasingly likely to make
such demands for continued LSMT, to request that "everything be done." 100
A recent Pew study found that in 1990, only 15% of Americans thought
health care providers should do everything to save life, but by 2005, 22% of
Americans 1° 1 and 27% of Californians 10 2 thought that doctors and nurses
should do everything possible to save a patient.
Several cultural and psychological factors motivate this uncompromising
attitude. Surrogates insist on continuing treatment that health care providers
consider medically inappropriate because: (1) they mistrust their providers,
(2) they have unrealistic expectations of medicine, (3) they are compelled by
religious beliefs, (4) they cannot bear the burden of decision, and (5) they do
not have to absorb the "costs" of their decisions.
1. Mistrust
The erosion of the physician-patient relationship and its reciprocal bonds
of loyalty 10 3 has been in full swing since the advent of the managed care
FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 378 (3rd ed. 2003) (identifying power sources and defining
moral power as "an appeal to strong beliefs, values, or what is considered to be 'right').
98 CRAVER, supra note 92, § 7.04[2][f].
99 Id.
100 See, e.g., Luce & White, supra note 12; WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 81, at 22-
34; Julie Sneider, Medical Ethics Experts See Shift in Care Disputes, MILWAUKEE Bus.
J., Apr. 22, 2005. ("[M]ore families are challenging doctors who believe additional
medical treatment of a critically ill patient is unwarranted."). See also John Ellement,
Woman Suing MGH Tells Court of Distress, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 1995, at 18;
Donalee Moulton, Death, Denial and the Law, 40 MED. POST [Toronto], May 4, 2004, at
29.
101 THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, MORE AMERICANS
DISCUSSING - AND PLANNING - END-OF-LIFE TREATMENT: STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
RIGHT TO DIE 24 (2006).
102 CALIFORNIA HEALTH CARE FOUNDATION, ATTITUDES TOWARD END-OF-LIFE
CARE IN CALIFORNIA 5, 20 (2006).
103 See Mark Hall, Law Medicine and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 470 (2002).
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era. 10 4 Changes in reimbursement policy and the fragmentation of care
delivery have undermined patient trust and confidence in provider
judgment. 10 5 Aware that physicians in capitated plans benefit financially
from limiting patient referrals and procedures, patients wonder if doctors
seeking to "stop the train" are merely trying to boost their own profits. 106
Traditionally marginalized groups are particularly suspicious. Racial
disparities in the diagnosis and treatment of serious disease have been
highlighted in both news and print media. 10 7 Minorities are primed for
evidence that they are receiving less and poorer care than their white fellows.
And this concern leads to dour interpretations of provider action in the end-
of-life context. 10 8 With consumers of medical care across a wide racial and
socio-economic spectrum questioning whether patient best interest remains at
the core of clinical judgment, it is unsurprising that provider
recommendations to limit care at the end of life would precipitate unease and
resistance.
104 See M. Schlesinger, A Loss of Faith: The Sources of Reduced Political
Legitimacy for the American Medical Profession, 80 MILBANK Q. 185, 185-87 (2002).
105 See, e.g., Belluck, supra note 16, at Al (reporting that some "patients and
families ... are skeptical of doctors' interpretations or intentions"); Joseph Fins, End-Of-
Life Care in the Hospital, in A PALLIATIVE ETHIC OF CARE: CLINICAL WISDOM AT LIFE'S
END 77, 78 (2006) ("An especially difficult dynamic can arise when the family believes
that the patient's dire condition was precipitated by a medical error or if they are
suspicious that substandard care is being provided because the patient is from a
traditionally marginalized population."); Lee, supra note 34, at 483; Kathryn L. Moseley
et al., Futility in Evolution, 21 CLINICAL GERIATRIC MEDICINE 211, 212-13 (2005)
(collecting cites); Mary Ellen Wojtasiewicz, Damage Compounded: Disparities, Distrust,
and Disparate Impact in End-of-Life Conflict Resolution Policies, AM. J. BIOETHICS,
Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 8-12.
106 See Bloche, supra note 64, at 2373; Dubler, supra note 60, at S22; DUBLER &
LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 6 ("The growth of managed care and . . . incentives for
undertreatment have fueled a growing mistrust... that the integrity of the care provided
may be affected by factors external to the best interests of the patient."); John M. Luce,
Making Decisions About the Forgoing of Life-sustaining Therapy, 156 AM. J.
RESPIRATORY CARE MED. 1715 (1997); Moseley et al., supra note 105, at 212.
107 See, e.g., Hilary Waldman, End-of-Life Care, Viewed in Stark Black and White,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at F5.
108 See THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, supra note
101, at 6, 24; CALIFORNIA HEALTH CARE FOUNDATION, supra note 102, at 5, 19; William
Bayer et al., Attitudes Toward Life-Sustaining Interventions Among Ambulatory Black
and White Patients, 16 ETHNICITY & DISEASE 914 (2006); James M. Garrett et al., Life-
Sustaining Treatments During Terminal Illness: Who Wants What?, 8 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED. 361, 361-68 (1993).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
2. Therapeutic Illusions
Even if not distrustful, surrogates might be in denial or under a
"therapeutic illusion" that the patient could recover or that a new therapy will
come along. 10 9 Unrealistic television portrayals of medicine contribute to
surrogates' over-optimism. 110 Easy access to medical information online
bolsters surrogates' confidence in opposing providers' recommendations. 111
Even in the face of clear and dire medical facts, family members often hold
out hope that the patient will beat the odds. 112 Having been treated to a
steady diet of medical advances and technological developments, patients
view Western medicine in semi-mystical terms. Newspapers trumpeting the
success stories of 21-week old preemies coaxed into health, 113 impossibly
109 See Susan Dorr Goold et al., Conflicts Regarding Decisions to Limit Treatment:
A Differential Diagnosis, 283 JAMA 909, 910-11 (2000); Stacey A. Tovino & William J.
Winslade, A Primer on the Law and Ethics of Treatment, Research, and Public Policy In
the Context of Severe Traumatic Brain Injury, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 2 n.5, 26 n.153
(2005) (discussing "therapeutic illusions" where patients have "false hopes despite the
lack of future benefit"); Leigh Middleditch & Joel Trotter, The Right to Live, 5 ELDER
L.J. 395, 402-03 (1997) (discussing "society's increasing denial of death").
110 See, e.g., Neal A. Baer, CPR on TV- Exaggerations and Accusations, 335 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1605, 1605-07 (1996); Susan J. Diem, Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation on
TV- Miracles and Misinformation, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1578, 1578-82 (1996).
111 See Sneider, supra note 100.
112 See Todd Ackerman, Hospital Rules to Unplug Baby Girl: Leukemia Patient's
Parents Scramble to Find New Care Facility, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 29, 2005, at B1
(reporting that the mother of Knya Dismuke-Howard, a 6-month old with leukemia in her
brain, multiple organ failure, and a life-threatening antibiotic-resistant infection believes
"I think she can beat the odds ... [s]he's a fighter."); Ralph Baergen, How Hopeful Is Too
Hopeful? Responding to Unreasonably Optimistic Patients, 32 PEDIATRIC NURSING 482
(2006); Belluck, supra note 16, at Al ("Extraordinary medical advances have stoked the
hopes of families."); Clare Dyer, Doctors Need Not Ventilate Baby to Prolong His Life,
329 BMJ 995 (2004) (reporting that mother of terminally ill infant rejected medical
advice because her baby was a "fighter" and "had lived longer than doctors had
predicted"); Bill Murphy, Life-and-Death Matter Goes to Court: Comatose Man's
Relative Fighting State Law, Hospital to Keep Him Alive, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 18, 2001,
at A37 (reporting that relatives opposed to removing life support "don't share the
conclusion that his condition is hopeless"). Cf In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d
182, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("[W]e understand why a parent... would hold out
hope ... If Mrs. Schiavo were our own daughter, we could not but hold to such a faith.").
113 See, e.g., World's Youngest Preemie, PEOPLE, Apr. 12, 2007, at 193 (reporting on
Amillia Taylor, the youngest premature baby to survive delivery and go home).
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complicated organ transplants, 114 and surgically re-attached limbs "15 lead
patients to not only hope for, but expect, marvels. Conscious that innovation,
drive, and derring-do have, in the health-care realm, pushed back the borders
of what was once thought impossible, surrogates are reluctant to accept that
sheer grit and determination won't produce a medical miracle for their loved
one.
3. Religion
Other times, surrogates appreciate that the odds are exceedingly slim, yet
still believe that those odds are worth pursuing. Religious faith leads some to
wait for divine intervention and avoid decisions that could be viewed as
meddling with life and death decisions that fall outside the jurisdiction of
mere mortals. 116 A variety of religious and cultural traditions stress the
sanctity of biologic life and some surrogates view efforts to withdraw
medical treatment as contrary to those religious teachings. 117
114 See, e.g., Bill Sanderson, Infant's Guts & Glory - Rebounding After 5-Organ
Transplant, N.Y. POST, Aug. 24, 2007, at 17 (reporting the recovery of Elijah Moulton
who received five transplanted organs).
115 See, e.g., Editorial, Miracle Surgery Boy on Mend, HERALD SUN (Melbourne,
Australia), Mar. 30, 2005, at 8 (reporting the recovery of Terry Vo, who had three
severed limbs reattached).
116 See, e.g., In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("The mother
opposes the discontinuation.., because she believes that all human life has value.., that
God will work a miracle"); Burns & Rushton, supra note 84, at 475 (31% of parents rated
"religious/spiritual beliefs" as very important to end-of-life decision making); Lee, supra
note 34, at 483; Robert Sibbald et al., Perception of 'Futile Care' Among Caregivers in
Intensive Care Units, 177 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 1201, 1204 (2007); Ed Yeates,
Parents Fight to Keep Son on Life Support, KSL Television Broadcast, Oct. 13, 2004
(parents sought an injunction to stop physicians from disconnecting their son from life
support even though he was declared dead because "we performed a miracle and I don't
see why we can't do that again"); Editorial, Parents Fear Home Delay May Keep
'Miracle' Baby Charlotte in Hospital, BIRMINGHAM POST (UK), Jan. 7, 2006, at 3
(reporting that parents of Charlotte Wyatt "are committed Christians" who believe that
"miracles do happen").
117 See, e.g., Rideout v. Hershey Med. Ctr., 30 Pa. D. & C. 4th 57, 62 (Pa. C.P. Ct.,
Dauphin Cty. 1995) (parents opposed to removing ventilator from daughter because of
"religious belief that all human life has value and should be protected"); James Bopp, Jr.
& Richard E. Coleson, Child Abuse by Whom? - Parental Rights and Judicial
Competency Determinations: The Baby K and Baby Terry Cases, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REv.
821, 841 (1994) ("I cannot make that decision to terminate life. God did not give me that
power.") (quoting Brief of Appellant, In re Achtabowski, No. 93-1247-AV (Mich. Cir.
Ct. Aug. 12, 1993) (No. 170251), at 39); Bill Murphy, Comatose Man Dies After Battle
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4. Family Dynamics
Complex family dynamics, unresolved tensions, and rivalries also
contribute to surrogate inflexibility. Surrogates who are estranged from the
patient feel unable to "let go" and accept that the reconciliation they once
hoped for is impossibly beyond reach. Other surrogates feel that foregoing
treatment signals abandonment and that remaining loyal to the patient
demands an unflagging commitment to deny death.' 18 Others are simply too
grief-stricken to stop treatment1 19 and lack the emotional strength to face
difficult facts or make hard choices. Still others, while emotionally at peace
with the prospect of their loved one's passing, believe--consistent with the
"technological imperative" in American medicine 120-that the patient is
Over Life Support: Family Cited Spiritual Beliefs, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 23, 2001, at A29
(reporting that for "spiritual and cultural reasons[,]" the family of Joseph Ndiyob sought
an injunction preventing Memorial Hermann Hospital from removing Ndiyob's life
support); John Carvel, Muslim Family Loses Right-to-Life Appeal, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED, Sept. 2, 2005 (noting the "family's religious conviction"); Lee, supra note
34, at 483; Emily Ramshaw, Children Fight to Save Mom: Carrolton: Hospital Seeks to
End Care of Woman with Brain Injury, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 18, 2006, at IB
("Ruthie Webster is deeply religious and believes only God should give and take life.");
Benjamin Weiser, The Case of Baby Rena: A Question of Letting Go: Who Should
Decide When Treatment is Futile?, WASH. POST, July 14, 1991, at Al (discussing the
religious views of Baby Rena's foster father).
118 See Goold et al., supra note 109, at 911; Jan Hoffman, The Last Word on the
Last Breath, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006 ("Families often believe that consenting to a
D.N.R. order implies they are giving up on their loved one, signing a death warrant");
Lee, supra note 34, at 483; John J. Paris et al., Has the Emphasis on Autonomy Gone Too
Far? Insights from Dostoevsky on Parental Decisionmaking in the NICU, 15 CAMBRIDGE
Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 147, 147 (2006); Wlazelek, supra note 57 ("It's dangerous to
give the family the last word since guilt and desire to do everything for mom or pop
makes it emotionally impossible to stop any treatment.") (quoting Arthur Caplan). See
also Fine et al., supra note 82, at 1221.
119 See, e.g., Alexander Morgan Capron, Abandoning a Waning Life, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1995, at 24 (reporting that Mass. General wrote a unilateral
DNR for Catherine Gilgunn because "the family's unpreparedness for their mother's death
did not justify mistreating the patient"); Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Proxy
Decision Making for Incompetent Patients: An Ethical and Empirical Analysis, 267
JAMA 2067, 2067 (1992) (family members find that they cannot "let the patient go").
120 The technological imperative represents the mindset that because we can use a
given technology, we should use that technology. See generally VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO
SHALL LIVE?: HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE (1974); Kathy L. Cerminara,
[Vol. 23:1 2007]
GETTING BEYOND THE LIMITS OF THE TALKING CURE
entitled to everything. 12 1
5. Externalization
Finally, it is easy for surrogates to act on these reasons because the costs
of their decisions are externalized. The financial burden is often borne by an
insurer. And health care providers, particularly nurses, bear the emotional
burden of treating the patient. 122
In short, many surrogates view their goal not just as important or
desirable, but as essential. 123 Consequently, they take a "firm, extreme
position, making [no] concessions." 124  They adopt a "hardball" 125
competitive negotiation style centered on this predetermined position such
that their initial position is also their bottom line. 12 6 Due to their
Dealing with Dying: How Insurers Can Help Patients Seeking Last-Chance Therapies
(Even When the Answer is "No'), 15 HEALTH MATRIX 285, 296 (2005); Robert L. Fine,
The History of Institutional Ethics at Baylor University Medical Center, 17 BAYLOR
UNIV. MED. CTR. PROC. 73, 74 (2004).
121 See, e.g., Arthur E. Kopelman, Understanding, Avoiding, and Resolving End-of-
Life Conflicts in the NICU, 73 MT. SINAI J. MED. 580, 582-85 (2006); Alan Meisel, The
Role of Litigation in End of Life Care: A Reappraisal, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-
Dec. 2005, at S47, S49 ("A vocal proportion of the population ... believes that life per se
is a pearl beyond price and must be preserved at all costs .... This set of beliefs [is]
known as vitalism"); Rivin, supra note 82, at 392; James W. Walter, Medical Futility -
an Ethical Issue for Clinicians and Patients, PRACTICAL BIoETics, Summer 2005, at 1,
6. See also Todd Ackerman, St. Luke's Postpones Removal of Life Support: Man's Family
Has Until 3 P.M. to Explore Any Possible Appeals, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 12, 2005, at B 1
("[T]he family understands there is no hope ... '[but] the decision when life support is
removed should be ours, not a corporation's..").
122 Cf Goold et al., supra note 109, at 913 ("[I]nsured families and patients [push]
to prolong inpatient treatment because they do not bear most of the cost); Robert M.
Taylor & John D. Lantos, The Politics of Medical Futility, 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 9
(1995).
123 Cf CRAVER, supra note 92, § 4.01[2] [a].
12 4 GARY GOODPASTER, A GUIDE TO NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION 23-24 (1997).
125 CONRAD LEVINSON, MARK S.A. SMITH, & ORVEL RAY WILSON, GUERILLA
NEGOTIATING: UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS TO GET WHAT You WANT 28-
34 (1999) (describing "hardball" negotiators as those who "want their own way [] and...
are unwilling or unable to consider an alternative position").
126 See JAY FOLBERG & DWIGHT GOLANN, LAWYER NEGOTIATION: THEORY,
PRACTICE, AND LAW 45-46 (2006); GIFFORD, supra note 87, at 150-51 (describing
"positional commitment" as pledging an "inalterable bargaining position and no more
concessions"). See generally Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on Competitive Bargaining,
1996 J. DIsP. RESOL. 325 (1996); JOHN W. COOLEY, THE MEDIATOR'S HANDBOOK § 4.4.1
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"intransigent passions," 127 they have "neither the interest nor the inclination
to compromise" 12
8
Normally, a party utilizing such strategic behavior risks a failure in the
negotiations. Parties to mediation must want to reach agreement. 129 Since
surrogates have no interest in reaching agreement, it is unclear that mediation
is even appropriate.130 "If... one of the parties prefers merely to defeat the
other side, then the mediation effort most likely will be fruitless." 131
Here, however, surrogates' unyielding strategy works because providers
cannot just walk away: "Stopping short of an agreement is rarely an
option." 132 Intransigence works well against risk-averse providers "who fear
the real or imagined consequences of non-settlement."' 3 3 Intransigence tests
providers' firmness and permits surrogates to see how much concession room
exists. 134 Surrogates' uncompromising stance pushes providers to yield their
bottom line, what they will maximally give. And, as it turns out, in most
instances providers will give all. 135 The obstinate approach works because
providers feel they that have no viable option outside the mediation. 136
(2000).
127 Schneiderman & Fein, supra note 90, at 10.
128 Dubler, supra note 77, at 10. See also Schneiderman & Fein, supra note 90, at 11
("no acceptable compromise"). But cf Hoffman, supra note 21, at 868 ("[A] family who
is unwilling to consent to removal of a patient from a ventilator or feeding tube might be
willing to accept a 'Do Not Resuscitate' (DNR) order.")
129 See generally Heidi Burgess & Guy Burgess, Intractability and the Frontier of
the Field, 24 CoNFLIcT RESOL. Q. 177, 180 (2006); Dubler, supra note 77, at 11
("Dispute resolution assumes that both sides want to settle a dispute"); DUBLER &
LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 5; LINDA FARBER POST, JEFFFREY BLUSTEIN, & NANCY
NEVELOFF DUBLER, HANDBOOK FOR HEALTH CARE ETHics COMMrTEES 151 (2007).
130 See HAROLD ABRAMSON, MEDIATION REPRESENTATION 20-22 (2004) (disputes
where a party is unwilling to compromise on principle are not suitable for mediation);
DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 12-13 (Where a patient has "strongly held religious
beliefs, value preferences" the provider "might need to capitulate"); Hoffman, supra note
21, at 863 ("[I]f any party views the dispute as one in which there is a definite right or
wrong answer and about which they have a highly moral or fundamentalist view,
mediation may not be effective.").
131 MARCUS,. supra note 61, at 342.
132 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 25. See also GIFFORD, supra note 87, at 37;
Schneiderman & Fein, supra note 90, at 10.
133 CRAVER, supra note 92, at § 7.04[2][f].
134 See GOODPASTER, supra note 124, at 23-24, 44.
135 See id.
136 See CRAVER, supra note 92, at § 7.04[2][f].
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B. Mediation Fails Because of the Misconception that Substantive
Health Care Decisions Law Disfavors Providers
Mediation occurs in the "shadow of the law," 137 against the "backdrop of
the likely range of results if the matter [were] fully adjudicated'at law." 138
After all, "if agreement cannot be reached in the mediation session, a series
of default rules... comes into play." 139
"[T]he outcome that the law will impose if no agreement is reached gives
each [party] certain bargaining chips-an endowment of sorts."'14o Since a
party typically will not agree to a settlement that provides less than they
could likely obtain in litigation, such entitlements typically determine the
minimum that a party will accept through bargaining. 141 Therefore, the party
expected to achieve a better outcome through litigation will have a higher
minimum and greater bargaining power.
It is widely believed that surrogates can anticipate favorable litigation
outcomes in end-of-life disputes. Specifically, based on the outcomes in
several well-publicized court cases, commentators consistently conclude that
"courts have almost universally sided with the family and against the
hospital ... ,"142 This assessment is widely reprinted in medical journals, 143
137 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979).
138 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Forgetfulness, Fuzziness, Functionality, Fairness, and
Freedom in Dispute Resolution: Serving Dispute Resolution Through Adjudication, 3
NEV. L.J. 305, 308 n.14 (2003).
139 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 25.
140 Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 137, at 968.
141 See Hyman & Love, supra note 62, at 162 ("[P]ublic law provides the norms that
guide private resolution... Parties often settle ... by keeping in mind and balancing the
entitlements the litigation system promises."); Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks
at Mediation: It's Here to Stay and Much Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196, 227
(2003) ("The results of mediation are frequently - I actually believe usually - dependent
upon the range of potential results that would come from formal adjudication.").
142 Jack K. Kilcullen, A Multilevel Examination of a Critically Ill Patient, in THREE
PATIENTS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTENSIVE CARE AT THE END OF LIFE 123
(David Crippen et al. eds., 2002); Edward F. Mcardle, New York's DNR Law:
Groundbreaking Protection of Patient Autonomy or a Physician's Right to Make Medical
Futility Determinations, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 55, 71 (2002) ("Numerous articles
have warned physicians of the serious legal risk in unilaterally writing a DNR order").
143 See, e.g., ACOG, supra note 68, at 792 ("Litigation has generally resulted in
courts supporting the view of patient or family."); Burt, supra note 90, at 250, 254; James
E. Szalados, Discontinuation of Mechanical Ventilation at End-of-Life: The Ethical and
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bioethics journals, 144 and law reviews. 145
Therefore, whatever the actual litigation risks to providers, they are
likely overestimated by all parties to the mediation. 146 Both providers and
surrogates believe that substantive end-of-life medical decisionmaking law
favors surrogates. Both believe that the law gives surrogates in end-of-life
cases a "veto authority" over clinical judgment. 147 Both expect that if
agreement were not reached in mediation, surrogates would probably win in
court.
But this assessment of providers' non-settlement alternatives is off-base.
"Its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a
[recognized] legal formula." 148 Not only have providers frequently prevailed
in futility cases, 149 but they also now have more legislative protection than
Legal Boundaries of Physician Conduct in Termination of Life Support, 23 CRIT. CARE
CLINIcs 317, 325 (2007). But see Luce & White, supra note 12, at 1106 (correctly noting
that Baby K and Wanglie did not "fac[e] the futility issue head on.").
144 See, e.g., Peter A. Clark, Medical Futility in Pediatrics, 23 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y
66 (2002).
145 See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 69; Patrick Moore, An End-Of-Life Quandary
in Need of a Statutory Response: When Patients Demand Life-Sustaining Treatment That
Physicians are Unwilling to Provide, 48 B.C. L. REv. 433, 439 (2007).
146 Cf Regina Ohkyusen-Cawley et al., Institutional Policies on Determination of
Medically Inappropriate Interventions: Use in Five Pediatric Patients, 8 PEDIATRIC CRIT.
CARE MED. 225, 225 (2007) ("[C]ourts have endorsed patient or surrogate insistence on
continued intervention, possibly fostering the reluctance of medical professionals to limit
nonbeneficial interventions."). Marshall Kapp argues that the legal risks in the early
1990s were not serious, yet concedes that physicians had "overblown anxiety." Kapp,
supra note 32, at 175; see also Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice
Policies in Malpractice Litigation, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 119, 119 (1991) ("[T]o
the extent that a crisis is in fact widely perceived, it has the quality of a self-fulfilling
prophecy").
147 Cf Jacquelyn Slomka, Clinical Ethics and the Culture of Conflict, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 45, 46 ("An increasingly litigious society as well as a
bioethical emphasis on patient and family autonomy . . . have led to physicians'
disempowerment"); Burt, supra note 90, at 254 (arguing that "[p]hysicians (and hospital
attorneys) should know" that a surrogate's ability to bring suit "is a considerable source of
bargaining advantage").
148 Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (referring to "assumption of risk" in tort law). Cf Schneiderman & Capron,
supra note 84, at 525 (noting that while legally irrelevant, "the Baby K decision captured
much attention").
149 See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Reassessing the Judicial Treatment of Medical
Futility Cases, 9 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR (forthcoming 2008) (collecting cites).
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ever before. 150 While some surrogates have successfully litigated medical
futility cases against providers, those cases are legally and factually unique
and simply cannot support a sweeping statement about the judicial treatment
of futility cases. 151
Most egregiously, the two cases most often cited in support of this dire
prediction, In Re Baby K152 and In re Wanglie,153 are inapposite to most
futility disputes. In neither case did the court address the propriety of
unilaterally refusing life-sustaining treatment. While the answers to the legal
questions asked in these two cases disfavored providers, they are not
questions lying at the core of most futility cases.
The outcome in Wanglie rested on the peculiar legal claim made in that
case, petition for appointment of a guardian.154 Helga Wanglie was an 87-
year-old woman who, as a result of a cardiac arrest, remained in a persistent
vegetative state and dependent on a ventilator. 155 Since Helga could never
appreciate any benefit from continued LSMT, Helga's health care providers
advised her husband, Oliver, to remove the ventilator. 156 But Oliver would
not consent to stopping LSMT.
The providers petitioned the local probate court to appoint a professional
conservator to make health care decisions for Helga. 157 The probate court
denied the petition, instead appointing Oliver, Helga's husband of fifty-three
years. 158 The providers never requested a court order to "stop any and all
treatment for Helga," 159 so the court never ruled on that claim. 160
150 See Pope, supra note 10 (surveying state statutes giving providers civil, criminal,
and disciplinary immunity for refusing to comply with inappropriate treatment requests).
151 See Pope, supra note 149. Cf. Meisel, supra note 121, at S48 ("Litigation attacks
problems piecemeal. Courts only answer questions they are asked and litigants only ask
questions that must be answered for the resolution of their particular dispute.").
152 In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), afid, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.
1994).
153 In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 28, 1991), reprinted in 2
Biolaw U:2162-2165 (Aug.-Sept. 1991), reprinted in 7 ISSUEs L. & MED. 369 (1992).
154 Id. at 369, 376.
155 Id. at 374-75.
156 Id. at 371.
157 Id. at 371, 376.
158 Id. at 372, 377. This type of claim may be difficult to win where the surrogate's
only fault is insisting on LSMT. See Pope, supra note 10.
159 Wanglie, at 377.
160 Cf Robert Schwartz, Autonomy, Futility, and the Limits of Medicine, 12 CAMBR.
Q. HEALTHCARE ETHics 159, 161 (1992) (arguing that whether Mr. Wanglie was his
wife's best substitute decision maker was the "wrong question.") ("The real question
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The outcome in Baby K similarly rested on a peculiar legal claim, the
coincidental application of a federal statute. Stephanie Keene was born with
anencephaly, a birth defect in which part of the skull and the higher brain are
missing.161. While Stephanie was later moved to a nursing home, she was
periodically transferred back to the hospital for breathing difficulties.
"Because aggressive treatment would serve no therapeutic or palliative
purpose [Stephanie's providers] recommended that [she] only be provided
with supportive care." 162 But Stephanie's mother would not consent, insisting
that Stephanie be provided with a ventilator.
Unlike the providers in Wanglie, Stephanie's providers directly and
specifically asked the court if they were obligated to provide the requested
LSMT. But the court framed their claim under the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). While the court ruled that the
providers were so obligated, that holding is limited to the peculiar facts of the
case. 163 Only because Stephanie arrived at the hospital in an "emergency
medical condition," was the hospital obligated to stabilize that condition. 164
EMTALA's scope is limited and it "cannot be invoked to require treatment in
the vast majority of futility cases." 165
It is unclear whether, as widely thought, the limited universe of legal
precedent really favors surrogates. But it is equally unclear that it favors
providers. At best, the law is uncertain. 166 But this indeterminacy empowers
surrogates no less than the perception of favorable substantive law.
(should have been] ...whether the continuation of ventilator support and gastronomy
feeding were among the reasonable medical alternatives that should have been available
to Mrs. Wanglie or her surrogate decision maker, whoever that might be.").
161 Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592.
162 Id. at 593.
163 See Schneiderman & Capron, supra note 84, at 525 ("Baby K actually provides
no judicial guidance on the legality of ceasing treatment deemed to be futile.") (citing
Alexander Morgan Capron, Medical Futility: Strike Two, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 42).
164Baby K, 16 F.3d at 594.
165 See THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 9, at § 13.06[C] (explaining that EMTALA
does not apply to inpatients). See also Pope, supra note 149 (collecting cases that
explicitly limit the scope of Baby K).
166 See infra notes 186-190 and accompanying text.
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C. Mediation Fails Because Legal Uncertainty Strongly Disfavors
Providers
Surrogates are able to engage in strategic behavior because they and
providers misperceive substantive norms. But even when substantive norms
are more accurately assessed as uncertain, rather than as hostile to unilateral
physician action, surrogates still gain a significant advantage in the
bargaining process. Specifically, surrogates can exploit providers' risk
aversion. 167
1. Substantive Health Care Decisions Law Is Uncertain
The outcome of litigation is always uncertain. 168 This is no less true with
respect to the litigation of medical futility disputes. 169 In 1999, when the
AMA encouraged hospitals to adopt futility guidelines, it noted that "the
legal ramifications of this course of action are uncertain." 170 Today, there is
still significant legal uncertainty. 171
167 Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 137, at 972-73; Jeremy A. Matz, We're All
Winners: Game Theory, The Adjusted Winner Procedure and Property Division at
Divorce, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 1339, 1355 (2001). Uncertainty weighs more heavily on
providers than surrogates, impeding the opportunity for negotiated dispute resolution.
While it is hardly clear that surrogates would win in litigation, the effect of uncertainty is
the same: providers make wholesale concessions in negotiations, as if it were clear that
they would lose in court. See infra notes 191-214 and accompanying text.
168 See Subrin, supra note 141, at 202-04 (providing a rich description of "the
multiple points of uncertainty" in legal proceedings and explaining that it is, therefore,
"very difficult to advise the client with any degree of precision").
169 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS COORDINATING COUNCIL ON LIFE-
SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT DECISION MAKING BY THE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR
STATE COURT DECISION MAKING IN LIFE SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT CASES 147
(2d ed. 1993) (finding that there is "as yet no consensus ... on the legal ramifications
associated with [futility]"); Jesse A. Goldner, Sandra H. Johnson, & Richard L. Wiener,
Responses to Medical Futility Claims, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 401, 401 (Alice
Gosfield ed., 1997) ("The current legal status of claims of medical futility is confusing.");
Nasraway, supra note 78, at 217 ("Unilateral withdrawal ... is still uncharted territory.").
170 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 67, at 940.
171 See Pope, supra note 10; Moore, supra note 145, at 433 ("Current precedent in
the area provides uncertain guidance"); id. at 437 ("The legal answers . . . are
inconclusive."); id. at 451 ("[i]nconsistent, if not incoherent, message"); id. at 462
("[v]oid ... in the law" forced providers to "speculate about their respective rights and
duties"); Karen Trotochaud, "Medically Futile" Treatments Require More than Going to
Court, 17 CASE MANAGER 60, 62 (2006) ("Although going to court has resulted in a
resolution of each case, no clear process for resolving further cases has evolved.").
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Lawyers, bioethicists, health care providers, and policymakers have had
enormous difficulty defining "medically inappropriate" treatment. 172 Years
of debate failed to produce any consensus. 173 This led policymakers to
design an approach with vague standards, giving substantial discretion to
health care providers and institutions.1 74 Rather than establish a clear
framework for determining medical inappropriateness, health care
decisionmaking statutes instead leave that determination to the judgment and
172 See generally Anderson-Shaw et al., supra note 81, at 303; Tom Tomlinson &
Diane Czlonka, Futility and Hospital Policy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1995, at
28, 33 (arguing "against any attempt to base a futility policy on some concrete definition
of futility"); David G. Warren, The Legislative Role in Defining Medical Futility, 56 N.C.
MED. J. 454-55 (1995) ("[T]here may be another wave of proposals in the state
legislatures to address the question of . . .medical futility. Drafting difficulties are
obvious").
173 See Moseley et al., supra note 105, at 211 ("[D]espite years of debate in
scholarly journals, professional meetings, and popular media, consensus on a precise
definition eludes us still."); see also Burt, supra note 90, at 249-50; Judith Daar, A Clash
at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy vs. A Physician's Professional Conscience, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1246 (1993); Goldner et al., supra note 169, at 416 (empirical
research study "suggests an absence of consensus"); Lee, supra note 34, at 482; Eric M.
Levine, A New Predicament for Physicians: The Concept of Medical Futility, the
Physician's Obligation to Render Inappropriate Treatment, and the Interplay of the
Medical Standard of Care, 9 J. L. & HEALTH 69, 73 (1995); Mark Strasser, The Futility of
Futility? On Life, Death, and Reasoned Public Policy, 57 MD. L. REv. 505, 514 (1998);
David M. Zientek, The Texas Advance Directives Act of 1999: An Exercise in Futility, 17
HEC F. 245, 251 (2005) ("Because of the difficulty in defining futility ... the [Texas]
statute is vague on a number of central issues.").
174 Bowman, supra note 65, at 1527 ("The reluctance of providers to act unilaterally
comes in part ... from a lack of medical agreement on a workable definition for futility
and a lack of legal support for overriding patient consent."); Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs, supra note 67, at 937 (rejecting a definition in favor of a process-based
approach); Matthew S. Ferguson, Ethical Postures of Futility and California's Uniform
Health Care Decisions Act, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217, 1220 (2002) (arguing that the
UHCDA does not "provide a clear definition of futility and fails to supply adequate
ethical context or constraints to guide difficult decisions"); id. at 1243 (noting that the
statute provides no "usable, clear standard that protects the physician"); id. at 1249 ("This
currently leaves a wide area of latitude that is without definitive form."); id. at 1254
(bemoaning the "lack of a clear demarcation of propriety within the new [California]
statute"); Johnson et al., supra note 69, at 36 ("Developing clarity in the boundaries of
futility is fundamental."); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Futility in Medical Decisions: The
Word and the Concept, 17 HEC F. 308, 313-14 (2005). (criticizing the process-based
approach); Keith Shiner, Medical Futility: A Futile Concept?, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
803, 810 (1996) ("[T]he legislative responses are incomplete."); cf THE RIGHT TO DIE,
supra note 9, § 13.02, at 13-7.
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discretion of the individual health care provider. 175 In this sense, the statutes
might be described as "purely enabling legislation." 176
The most prevalent form of "unilateral decision" statute is modeled on
the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act (UHCDA), now adopted in ten
states. 177 The UHCDA makes clear that a provider's obligation to comply
with a surrogate's decision "is not absolute." 178 A health care provider or
health care institution may decline to comply with an individual instruction
that requires "medically ineffective health care" or "health care contrary to
generally accepted health care standards." 179 A health care provider may also
decline to comply for "reasons of conscience." 180 Moreover, as adopted in
175 This is hardly surprising given that the inappropriate treatment question concerns
tough "issues concerning the meaning that we attach to life . . . self-determination, the
nature of the physician-patient relationship, and the just allocation of scarce health care
resources." See Shiner, supra note 174, at 808-09.
176 J.K. MASON & G.T. LAURIE, MASON AND MCCALL SMITH'S LAW AND MEDICAL
ETHICS 596 (7th ed. Oxford 2006). It is not unusual for policymakers to pass
responsibility to decision makers when they cannot agree on rules or guidelines. See Carl
E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA 's Best-Interest
Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215, 2244-45 (1991). See also ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS:
THE ROLE OF LAW IN BIOETHICAL DECISION MAKING 138-39, 144-45 (Indiana 1996)
(arguing that given factual variability of the issues and the lack of public consensus,
matters should be left to the medical profession with minimal legal oversight); Elizabeth
Day, Do Not Resuscitate and Don't Bother Consulting the Family, TELEGRAPH [UK],
Mar. 14, 2004, at 22 ("There is the possibility of legislation, but in a field as controversy
strewn as medical ethics, a blanket law remains an imperfectly blunt tool.").
177 Uniform Health Care Decisions Act §§ 1-19, 9 U.L.A. 93 (1993), reprinted in
12 ISSUES L. & MED. 83 (2006) [hereinafter UHCDA]. See Pope, supra note 10
(describing history and prevalence of the UHCDA).
178 UHCDA, prefatory note 7 ("The obligation to comply is not absolute, however.
A health-care provider or institution may decline to honor an instruction or decision for
reasons of conscience or if the instruction or decision requires the provision of medically
ineffective care or care contrary to applicable health-care standards."); id. § 4, comment
9 ("[H]ealth-care instructions . . . are binding . . . subject to exceptions specified in
Section 7(e)-(f), on the individual's health-care providers."); id. § 5, comment 1 7 ("Not
all instructions or decisions must be honored, however.").
179 UHCDA §§ 7(f) & 13(d). See generally ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a) (2006);
ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.060(f) (2006); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4735 & 4654 (2007); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2508(0 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-7(f) (2005); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18-a § 5-807(0 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-7(F) & 24-7A-13(D)
(2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-215(6) (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1808(e)
(2006); WYO. STAT. §§ 35-22-408(f) & 35-22-414(d) (2005).
1 80 UHCDA § 7(e). See generally CAL. PROB. CODE § 4734; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-
11-1808(c).
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several states, the UHCDA confers immunity on providers who exercise
these provisions. 18 1
But the UHCDA accords the provider substantial discretion in
determining the circumstances under which treatment is inappropriate.1 82
The UHCDA permits providers to decline to comply with requests for
treatment that would be medically ineffective. 183 But "medically ineffective"
treatment, in turn, is defined simply as treatment that would not provide
"significant benefit." 184 The UHCDA allows the health care provider broad
discretion to determine whether the benefit achievable by a treatment is
"significant. ".185
Although it would seem that the UHCDA and its progeny are designed to
181 CAL. PROB. CODE § 4740 ("A health care provider.., acting in good faith and in
accordance with generally accepted health care standards applicable to the health care
provider ... is not subject to civil or criminal liability or to discipline for unprofessional
conduct for any actions in compliance with this division"). See also ALA. CODE § 22-8A-
8(a) ("shall not be liable for such refusal") (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2510(a)(5)
(2003); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5-809(a)(2) (1998); N.M. STAT. § 24-7A-9(A)(4); WYo.
STAT. § 35-22-410(a)(v).
182 Ferguson, supra note 174, at 1221 ("These sections seemingly create an open-
ended excuse for a physician to withdraw treatment. The UHCDA provides a mere
framework... [and] gives only broad platitudes"). Indeed, the drafters of the UHCDA
recognized this, observing "it really provides no immunity at all ... every question of
reasonable care is a jury question." National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, Uniform Health Care Decisions
Act, July 31, 1992, at 142 (Calkins, Comm.). "That is one of the reasons why we want to
get something in the black letter that talks about acceptable health-care standards." id. at
144 (Franck, Comm.). Louisiana, for example, had a unilateral decision statute in 1998
exempting providers from care that was "medically inappropriate" and "contrary to
medical judgment." Sonya Causey's providers sought the protection of this statute when
they unilaterally withdrew her LSMT. But since these terms were not defined, a state
appellate court had no choice but to remand the family's malpractice case for further
litigation to determine the standard of care. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1076.
183 UHCDA §§ 7(f) & 13(d).
184 UHCDA comment to § 7(f) ("'Medically ineffective health care', as used in this
section, means treatment which would not offer the patient any significant benefit."). As
adopted, one UHCDA state defines "medically ineffective treatment" more tightly, as
medical procedures which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, will not: "(1)
Prevent or reduce the deterioration of the health of an individual; or (2) Prevent the
impending death of an individual." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2501(m) (2007).
185 See Ferguson, supra note 174, at 1221 ("These sections seemingly create an
open-ended excuse for a physician to withdraw treatment. The UHCDA provides a mere
framework ... [and] gives only broad platitudes.").
178
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shelter physicians from litigation when they seek to limit treatment at the end
of life, these statutory safe harbors are not navigable. In order to work safe
harbors must be clear and precise. 186 While this vagueness appears to
empower health care providers to determine the circumstances under which
they may refuse to comply with treatment requests, it also leaves them
significantly uncertain about whether they are actually satisfying the
requirements for safe harbor status. 187 What are generally accepted health
care standards? What is a "significant benefit"?
Some have suggested that, although vague, the unilateral decisions
statutes could have been effective if "the medical community. . . [had]
articulate[d] and thereafter follow[ed] uniform practice standards regarding
futile care . .."188 For example, recognizing the dynamic advancement in
186 Cf James F. Blumstein, Medical Malpractice Standard-Setting: Developing
Malpractice "Safe Harbors" as a New Role for QIOs?, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1017, 1049
(2006) (explaining that flexibility is not a desirable objective for a safe harbor).
187 See generally Ferguson, supra note 174, at 1243 (noting that the statute provides
no "usable, clear standard that protects the physician"); Anne L. Flamm, The Texas
'Futility' Procedure: No Such Thing as a Fairy Tale Ending, LAHEY CLINIC MED. ETHICS
J., Spring 2004 ("The promise of immunity, of course, is not guaranteed; patients can
challenge a provider's adherence to [the statute]."); Hall, supra note 57, at 451 ("On
balance, it is difficult to offer much assurance about the existing legal climate regarding
futility policies."); Maureen Kwiecinski, To Be or Not to Be, Should Doctors Decide?
Ethical and Legal Aspects of Medical Futility Policies, 7 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR 313,
349-50 (2006) ("When treatment can be or should be described as inappropriate is not
defined by the statute.... This lack of boundaries and oversight allows the providers too
much discretion."); Meisel & Jennings, supra note 82, at 75 ("[T]he law is unclear on
what should be done."); Bryan Rowland, Communicating Past the Conflict: Solving the
Medical Futility Controversy with Process-Based Approaches, 14 U. MIAMI INT'L &
COMp. L. REV. 271, 297 (2006) ("[Tlhese statutes provide little guidance in regards to the
limiting of the obligation for physicians to provide ongoing care they believe futile.");
Schneiderman & Capron, supra note 84, at 528 (arguing that unless "limits" and
"endpoints" are defined, "end-of-life outcomes are likely to be determined less by
medical circumstances and justifiable standards and more by individual healthcare
providers' tolerance for risk, patients' and families' varying degrees of knowledge and
rhetorical skills, and economic considerations."); Tovino & Winslade, supra note 109, at
29 (observing that in futility cases "no widely accepted ethical and legal framework exists
to govern decision making"). Cf In re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731, 738 (Wash. 1980) (noting,
with respect to brain death, that "[a]doption of [a legislative] standard will alleviate
concern among medical practitioners that legal liability will be imposed when life support
systems are withdrawn"). But cf Goldner et al., supra note 169, at 409 ("[C]ourts are
hesitant to penalize physicians who reasonably rely on what they perceive to be
professional standards").
188 Carol Isackson, Futile Treatment: The Need for Legislation and Uniform
Policies, HEALTH CARE L. NEWS, Oct. 1994, at 7, 11; see also Kapp, supra note 32, at
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
technology, the drafters of the Uniform Determination of Death Act did not
specify any exact diagnoses in the statute itself. Yet, in implementing the
UDDA, providers developed clinical criteria. 189 In contrast, with respect to
medical inappropriateness under the UHCDA, providers neither articulated
nor adhered to any clear universal standards of practice. Consequently, the
practice of deferring to surrogate demands itself has become the standard of
care. 
190
2. Normative Uncertainty Strongly Disfavors Providers
Because They Are Risk-Averse
The uncertain state of the law governing medical futility disputes is not
obviously fatal to the mediation of some such disputes. Mediation normally
thrives in an atmosphere of normative indeterminacy. In most instances,
indeterminacy produces a mediation-friendly environment because neither
party wants to roll the dice and risk an unwelcome outcome in litigation. The
inability to gauge non-settlement alternatives leaves both parties with
questionable BATNAs and incentives to settle. 191 Therefore, one might think
that futility disputes would be ripe for mediation. 192
But this assumes that the possibility of loss in court affects all parties
equally, pushing them toward compromise. In futility cases this assumption
is false. Substantive uncertainty places party risk-aversion (or risk-attraction)
in high relief. Uncertainty about the outcome in court disadvantages the
172 (noting the need for "broad consensus within the medical community" and "societal
agreement").
189 See James L. Bernat, The Whole-Brain Concept of Death Remains Optimum
Public Policy, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHIcS 35, 40 (2006).
190 Cf Peter Albertson, Clinical Crossroads, 274 JAMA 69, 73 (1995) ("[T]here's
an interesting catch-22 - the medicolegal standard of care becomes what physicians do. If
... physicians all [provide inappropriate treatment] for fear of being sued if they don't,
then eventually if enough of them do it, they'll create the truth of their fear."); Clark C.
Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 97 (1991).
191 Cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 137, at 969 (the legal standards' "lack of
precision" provides a "bargaining backdrop clouded by uncertainty.").
192 See Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A
Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGs L.J. 703, 721 (1997) ("[A] conflict involving the
provision of arguably futile medical care would be suitable for norm-generating
mediation because no ethical or legal consensus exists regarding how futility is to be
defined.").
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relatively risk-averse party because that party will accept less in order to
avoid the gamble inherent in adjudication. 193 Here, health care providers are
the risk-averse party. The overt or implicit threat of litigation plays on
providers' vulnerability. Although capitulating to surrogate demands for
inappropriate treatment makes providers unhappy, they prefer this
unhappiness to the misery of being sued. Distasteful though it may be, they
calculate "that the cost of disagreeing with proposed offers transcends the
cost of acquiescence." 194
The law exerts a powerful influence on the conduct of health care
providers. 195 This influence generally causes providers to be conservative
and ultra-cautious. 196 "Hospitals are risk-averse institutions and physicians
193 See Matz, supra note 167, at 1358 ("Strategic behavior will be more effective
and subtly encouraged as entitlements become more vague.") (citing Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 137, at 972-73). Surrogates are risk preferers. They would rather
take the gamble than accept the certain outcome. Cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note
137, at 970-71.
194 CRAVER, supra note 92, § 7.04[2][b][i]. See also GOODPASTER, supra note 124,
at 43 (threat of suit plays on vulnerability); GIFFORD, supra note 87, at 143-45; Matz,
supra note 167, at 1358. Because a bluff or threat cannot be evaluated properly if the law
regarding the outcome is unclear, there is a higher chance of succeeding through these
tactics. So, surrogates can exploit the uncertainty.
195 See, e.g., Marshall B. Kapp, Legal Liability Anxieties in the ICU, in MANAGING
DEATH IN THE INTENSIVE CARE UNIT: THE TRANSITION FROM CURE TO COMFORT 232, 232
(. Randall Curtis & Gordon D. Rubenfeld eds., 2001) ("[L]aw-related anxieties are
palpable influences on . . . medical care."); RUTH MACKLIN, MORTAL CHOICES:
BIOETHICS IN TODAY'S WORLD 11 (1987) ("Fear of legal liability frequently drives
medical decision-making, thus contaminating the process by introducing considerations
that are not patient-centered."); MARCUS, supra note 61, at 372 ("There is nothing more
professionally disenfranchising than being told you are expendable. The message can
come in a number of shapes: . . .the subpoena alerting you to an impending lawsuit");
Rowland, supra note 187, at 307 ("Legal considerations are of paramount concern when
discussing the discortinuation of care."); Carl E. Schneider, Regulating Doctors, 29
HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1999, at 21; CONNIE ZUCKERMAN, End-of-Life Care
and Hospital Legal Counsel: Current Involvement and Opportunities for the Future,
MILBANK REP. 4 (Jan. 1999) ("Legal considerations.., strongly influence how clinicians
think about end-of-life care."). Cf. Marc R. Lebed & John J. McCauley, Mediation Within
the Health Care Industry: Hurdles and Opportunities, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 911, 920
(2005) (settling for even one penny "can directly or indirectly negatively impact
physicians' ability to maintain good standing with their malpractice carriers, providers,
peers, and patients, and may even jeopardize their hospital staff privileges and medical
board status.").
196 See, e.g., MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS:
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULATION 70 (2003) ("Doctors egregiously over-
estimate the risks of being sued by their patients."); Robert F. Weir & Larry 0. Gostin,
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are risk-averse professionals." 197
This ultra-cautious approach is certainly no less true in the context of
futility disputes. 198 Before taking unilateral action providers want clear legal
Decisions to Abate Life-Sustaining Treatment for Non-autonomous Patients, 264 JAMA
1846, 1846 (1990) ("[H]ospital attorney[s] ... are frequently inclined to give advice that
is unduly conservative."); Alan Weisbard, Defensive Law: A New Perspective on
Informed Consent, 146 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 860, 860 (1986) ("[T]he lawyer's ...
advice is likely to become ultracautious and may tend to conflict with the responsible
practice of medicine"); ROBERT ZUSSMAN, INTENSIVE CARE MEDICINE: MEDICAL ETHICS
AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION 181 (1992) ("Unfortunately, because of a fear of being
sued at a later date, most physicians really are willing to provide every available
technology to a patient").
197 Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Creating and Supporting The Proxy-Decider: The
Lawyer-Proxy Relationship, 35 GA. L. REV. 517, 527 (2001) ("[P]hysicians and hospitals
are still skittish in the face of withholding or withdrawing care."). See also MICHAEL
FREEMAN & ANDREW LEWIS, LAW AND MEDICINE 82 (2000) (observing how "the fear of
litigation" encourages providers "to adopt risk-averse strategies such as defensive
medicine or the avoidance of high risk specialties"); Gatter, supra note 65, at 1122
("Physicians are highly motivated to avoid lawsuits"); MARSHALL B. KAPP, OUR HANDS
ARE TIED: LEGAL TENSIONS AND MEDICAL ETHICS 2 (1998) (observing that providers are
"highly risk-averse in terms of their own perceived legal exposure").
198 See, e.g., Allan S. Brett, Futility Revisited: Reflections on the Perspectives of
Families, Physicians, and Institutions, 17 HEC F. 276, 283-84 (2005) ("[T]he threat of
litigation is an important reason, perhaps the major reason, that physicians are reluctant to
withhold or withdraw 'futile' life-sustaining treatment unilaterally against the wishes of
family members."); MARILYN J. FIELD & RICHARD E. BEHRAMN EDS., WHEN CHILDREN
DIE: IMPROVING PALLIATIVE CARE AND END-OF-LIFE CARE FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR
FAMILIES 322 (2003) ("[I]t is increasingly clear that before a physician may terminate life
support on any patient [where the family objects] ... she or he should assume that it is
necessary to ask a court for an order."); Fletcher, supra note 81, at S.230 (noting that
health care organizations must "wait for clarification of the law ...on which futile
treatments can be withheld or withdrawn" and in the meantime must "treat until the
dispute is resolved"); Hall, supra note 146, at 119 ("[T]o the extent that a crisis is in fact
widely perceived, it has the quality of a self-fulfilling prophesy"); Marshall Kapp, Legal
Anxieties and End-of-Life Care in Nursing Homes, 9 ISSuES L. & MED. 111, 119 (2003)
(discussing how a "broad fear" of both "regulatory sanctions for providing too little
LSMT" and "civil malpractice action[s]" means that "demands for aggressive LSMT
virtually always control[] the situation regardless of how inappropriate that demand may
be."); Kapp, supra note 195, at 242 (recommending that in the absence of "unambiguous
legal guidance" providers accede to surrogate requests); John D. Lantos, When Parents
Request Seemingly Futile Treatment for their Children, 73 MT. SINAI MED. J. 698, 698
(2006) ("Most doctors are not willing to ... take the risk that punishment, rather than
forgiveness, may come their way.").
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protection. 199 Without that protection and unable to secure surrogate consent
to stopping LSMT, providers have continued to comply with requests that
they consider inappropriate. 200 They have "surrendered their position out of
199 See Fletcher, supra note 81, at S.231 ("The framers of such futility guidelines
would also be well-advised to seek amendments to existing health care legislation that
strengthen the authority of clinicians and health care organizations to resolve such
disputes."); id. at S.229 ("[A]ction was necessary in the Virginia legislature to assure
physicians of legal backing if they refused, in certain circumstances, to acquiesce to
demands for overtreatment."); Isackson, supra note 188, at 10 ("In order to protect
providers from arbitrary decisions . . . legislation should be enacted"); Halevy &
McGuire, supra note 82, at 38 ("Many institutions were interested in pursuing policies
that would allow physicians to refuse [but] the legal and ethical uncertainties . . .
discouraged institutions from proceeding alone."); Susan Jacoby, The Schiavo Factor,
AARP BULL., May 2005 ("In states without such [futile care] laws, doctors frequently
comply with the family's wishes for fear of being sued."); Weiser, supra note 117
(reporting how doctors in the Baby Rena case promised to keep pressing to change the
rules, to give doctors the authority they think they need in futile cases).
200 See, e.g., Belluck, supra note 16 ("In the absence of laws like Texas's, hospitals
often accede to a family's wishes because they fear being sued."); Robert L. Fine, The
Texas Advance Directives Act of 1999: Politics and Reality, 13 HEC F. 59, 63 (2001).
("Guidelines in the face of legal uncertainty, however, were not particularly effective.
[F]ew physicians were willing to limit such treatment in the face of potential lawsuits
from families who disagreed."); Stacey Burling, Penn Hospital to Limit Its Care in Futile
Cases: Severely Brain-Damaged Patients Won't Get Certain Treatments, as a Rule,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 4, 2002 ("The weak point of virtually all policies is that hospital
leaders fear they would lose a lawsuit if they denied care demanded by a family.");
Cerminara, supra note 120, at 327 ("[G]ood process . . . will not insulate a decision
maker from being overturned in court .... "); Fine et al., supra note 82, at 1221 (where
families insisted on continued LSMT "physicians complied, being unwilling to subject
themselves to legal jeopardy by overruling the family/surrogate"); Flamm, supra note
187 ("[T]he previous ambiguity of legal consequences often prevented clinicians from
fulfilling ethical obligations against providing medically inappropriate care."); Halevy &
McGuire, supra note 82, at 38 ("[R]esidual legal uncertainty regarding the policy still
lingered."); Kopelman, supra note 121, at 585 ("Uncertainty about the legal implications
of acting against the patient's or surrogate's wishes often prevents physicians from taking
[the unilateral] step, despite agreement among all or almost all clinicians."); Rivin, supra
note 82, at 392 (noting that of those physicians who thought a case futile, they were
unwilling to invoke policy for "fear of a lawsuit"); Mildred Z. Solomon et al., Decisions
Near the End of Life: Professional Views on Life-sustaining Treatment, 83 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 14, 19 (1993); (reporting physician uncertainty about legal standards for
withdrawing treatment); Swig et al., supra note 82, at 1218 (citing "legal considerations"
as the explanation for why physicians did not utilize their futility policy). Cf Brett, supra
note 198, at 289 (noting the "pragmatic problem with policies that confer no legal
protection."); Schneiderman & Capron, supra note 84, at 525 ("[T]he Baby K decision..
. had a chilling effect on hospitals' willingness to implement futility policies."); FIELD &
BEHRAMN, supra note 198, at 322 ("[T]he findings of an ethics committee have no legal
183
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their fear of a capricious legal system." 20 1
Just as mediation may be inappropriate in light of surrogates'
intransigence, 20 2 it may also be inappropriate given the extreme differential
in bargaining power. 20 3 The extreme "mismatch" between providers' and
surrogates' risk tolerance and risk aversion disadvantages risk-averse
standing and cannot be used alone as the basis for termination of life support.").
201 Sibbald et al., supra note 116, at 1203 (reporting from a survey of ICUs: "When
participants were asked why they followed the instructions of families or substitute
decision makers instead of doing what they feel is appropriate, almost all cited a lack of
legal support."); William D. Strinden, Ethics, Cost of Futile Care, Hous. CHRON., May 8,
2007, at B8. Of course, legal liability is based on probabilities, depending on available
evidence, factfinders, and so on. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of
Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965, 968-69 (1984).'
Different providers and their counsel have different levels of risk tolerance. See Lee,
supra note 34, at 488 ("As difficult as it might seem, some surgeons might adhere to their
professional conscience and withdraw life-sustaining treatments over the surrogate's
objections. They then must be willing to accept the risk of legal action as in Gilgunn,
Bryan, and Causey."). Notable among the less risk-averse providers is Massachusetts
General Hospital. See Troyen A. Brennan, Ethics Committees and Decisions to Limit
Care, 260 JAMA 803, 806-07 (1988) (describing the "Optimum Care Committee's"
recommendation of unilateral DNR orders despite legal uncertainty); Nasraway, supra
note 78, at 215 ("[T]he hospital's risk management division had uncommon determination
in supporting the care providers toward unilateral withdrawal of therapy."). For example,
in the Gilgunn case, the "hospital's legal office ... told [the attending physician] he was
'okay' legally; as long as he was acting in the patient's best interests he could withhold
[LSMT]."). See Capron, supra note 119, at 25. While Massachusetts law only allows
health care providers to decline treatment requests for moral or religious reasons, it also
seems to authorize a proxy to make only those health care decisions that are "consistent
with responsible medical practice." Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 201D §§ 13-
14, with §§ 1 & 5 (2007). Since many state statutes confer immunity on providers
refusing to comply with a surrogate's decisions made "outside her authority," this
argument seemingly could ground much unilateral decisionmaking.
202 See supra notes 129-131.
203 See, e.g., Dubler, supra note 77, at 11 (Mediation is "inappropriate for long-
festering conflict[] where one side has all the cards ([in a futility dispute] the family
member) and is ready to play them to her advantage."); POST ET AL., supra note 129, at
152 (mediation is futile where "conflict is out of control before it comes to the attention
of the mediator."); Hoffman, supra note 21, at 861 (arguing that disputes are typically
"appropriate for mediation" when "the parties have 'relatively' equal bargaining power");
Post, supra note 58, at 347 ("Mediation presupposes that the parties [have] relatively
equal ... power. This level playing field permits the collaborative crafting of a mutually
satisfying resolution."); LEONARD L. RisKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 115 (1987) ("[Mlediation is appropriate only where
disputants are about equally powerful.").
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providers while tending to benefit risk-preferring surrogates. 204 That is, risk-
averse providers would rather accept a known agreement than risk an
unknown adjudication. 205 They have "an easier path to bailing out," 206 a
greater incentive to reach an agreement--on any terms.
Providers' risk aversion weakens their bargaining position by weakening
their BATNA. If the alternative to mediation is litigation and providers are
eager to avoid litigation, then they are all-too-ready to make huge
concessions. But risk aversion is not the whole story. Normative uncertainty
feeds not only providers' aversion to risk but also their aversion to litigation
itself. 207
Health care providers are distressed and offended by administering
inappropriate treatment. 208 Yet, they are not invested in pressing the issue of
futile care because the costs of continuing to fight are typically greater than
the costs of settling on the surrogate's terms. 209 While distressed at providing
what they judge to be inappropriate treatment, no individual physician has to
204 Stempel, supra note 138, at 313. "The risk acceptant disputant can take
advantage of this [risk tolerance mismatch] by driving a hard bargain in [mediation] or
only participating cosmetically in the [mediation] procedures. After all, the risk-
preferring disputant is just as happy to roll the dice through adjudication unless it can get
a really good deal in [mediation]." Id.
205 Cf Matz, supra note 167, at 1357 (citing Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note
137, at 971-72).
206 Stempel, supra note 138, at 313. See also Hyman & Love, supra note 62, at 170
n.31 ("When gross power disparities are present, the fairness of a process based on
autonomous bargaining becomes questionable.") (citing Joseph Stulberg, Fairness and
Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 909, 924-25 (1998)).
207 Cf Subrin, supra note 141, at 206 ("The entire litigation process is anxiety-
provoking and privacy-invading.").
208 See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
209 Cf RANDALL R. BOVJBERG & BRIAN RAYMOND, PATIENT SAFETY, JUST
COMPENSATION AND MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM 6 (Kaiser Permanente Inst. for Health
Pol'y 2003) (describing potential adverse consequences of a malpractice suit as "adverse
publicity, emotional distress, substantial loss of time from practice ..., investigation by
peer review or institutional management . . ., reporting to the [NPDB] . . ., increased risk
of disciplinary action by state authorities and exclusion from managed care networks");
Moore, supra note 145, at 458 ("Fear of a lengthy judicial process may result in health
care providers adopting de facto policies that encourage indefinite provision of
treatment"); Burgess & Burgess, supra note 129, at 178; Lee, supra note 34, at 488
(observing that for most providers "the risks may outweigh their need for professional
autonomy," so they "comply with the surrogate's wishes and continue the life-sustaining
treatments"); Meisel, supra note 121, at S48 ("Litigation is expensive and emotionally
draining"); Morreim, supra note 90, at 36 ("The mere prospect of litigation, then, may
leave physicians feeling they have no choice but to accede").
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deal with this distress for very long. Often either the patient will die or the
provider will round-off service for that patient. 210 In short, litigation lasts
longer and is more stressful than just waiting for the problem to "go
away." 211
Since providers perceive such an undesirable BATNA, any outcome in
mediation appears preferable. They would rather accept a certain outcome in
order to avoid the risk of litigation. 212 They are, as Leonard Marcus puts it,
"opposed 'to exercising any BATNA." 213 But this unwillingness ultimately
impairs providers' negotiation effectiveness. Surrogates can and do detect
this attitude. And when they realize that providers have ruled out any
BATNA, surrogates understand that there is no limit to what they can
demand. 214
V. SOLUTION: AMEND SUBSTANTIVE NORMS TO CLARIFY SAFE
' HARBORS AND EQUALIZE BARGAINING POWER
While we may call it "mediation," the guided facilitation of intractable
210 See Carhart, supra note 59, at 1756; Capron, supra note 119, at 24; Meisel, supra
note 121, at S48 ("[I]n many end of life cases the patient expires before the litigation
does.").
211 Cf. LEARNED HAND, 3 LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics, ASSOCIATION OF BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK 105 (1926) ("After now some dozen years of experience, I must say
that as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness
and death.").
212 MARCUS, supra note 61, at 296 ("At what point are conditions so deplorable that
you are willing to accept the financial uncertainty of unemployment, the professional
risks of a public scandal, or the high costs of a court battle?").
213 Id. at 296 ("There are others who... maintain that persistence at the negotiation
table is the only way to settle differences. These people will continue collaborating,
talking, or conceding, no matter the cost."). Grenig recommends that when "a party finds
the negotiations have fallen below the minimum acceptable position, the party should
invoke its BATNA and walk away from the negotiations." GRENIG, supra note 21 § 3.10,
at 54 (citing FRASCOGNA & HETHERINGTON, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO NEGOTIATION: A
STRATEGIC APPROACH TO BETTER CONTRACTS AND SETTLEMENTS 55 (2001)). But in a
futility dispute providers will never do that.
214 See MARCUS, supra note 61, at 296. Mnookin and Kornhauser observe that
litigation is more likely where a party has "distaste for negotiation." Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 137, at 974-75. Here, it is just the opposite. Providers' distaste
for litigation not only makes it more likely that the dispute will be mediated but also
gives surrogates more bargaining strength to extract agreement. Since providers are so
desperate for agreement, surrogates demand more, knowing that providers will give in.
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futility disputes is no such thing. The negotiation is one-sided and the
outcome is fixed and predictable. 215 Given providers' and surrogates'
different levels of commitment and risk tolerance, the shadow of the law is
outcome-determinative.
The mislabeling of current conciliation efforts at the end of life is
regrettable as a definitional matter. But process confusion is hardly the
greatest ill. Rather, the biggest problem with the status quo is substantive.
Not only are existing outcomes fixed and predictable, they are undesirable as
a matter of policy. To avoid these outcomes, we must equalize providers'
bargaining power by giving them a purely process-defined safe harbor to
refuse inappropriate treatment requests.
A. The Shadow of the Law Produces Unacceptable Outcomes
We hardly have the space, here, to make a complete -argument for
empowering providers to refuse inappropriate treatment requests. But we can
at least quickly review the leading arguments. There are five main reasons
for empowering providers: (1) to protect the integrity of the medical
profession, (2) to reduce patient suffering, (3) to avoid instilling false hope,
(4) to rationalize the use of scarce resources, and (5) to relieve surrogates of
the burden of decision.
1. Protecting the Integrity of the Medical Profession
Physicians should not be "indentured servants," 216  "reflexive
automatons," 217 "vending machines," 218 or "prostitutes" 219 beholden to
whatever patients or surrogates want. Patient autonomy has never been
construed as requiring a health professional to provide a particular type of
treatment. 220 Medicine is not a consumer commodity like breakfast cereal
215 Cf Prendergast et al., supra note 52, at 63 (noting that the "simplest way" to
suppress conflict is to have "a single arbiter, one party invested with sole authority for
making those decisions").
216 Morreim, supra note 90, at 37.
217 WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 81, at 58. See also id. at 103-04.
218 Id. at 9.
219 Id. at 126.
220 See Loane Skene, Disputes About the Withdrawal of Treatment: The Role of
Courts, 32 L.J. MED. & ETHics 701, 701 (2004) (citing Schwartz, supra note 160).
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and toothpaste. 221 Rather, the medical profession is a self-governing one
with its own standards of professional practice.
The "integrity of the medical profession" is an important societal interest
that must be balanced against patient autonomy. 222 The definition of the
goals and values of medicine may be a shared responsibility between the
medical profession and the rest of society. But it certainly need not
categorically cede to patient autonomy.
In particular, many health care providers do not consider the practice of
medicine to include measures aimed solely at maintaining corporeal
existence and mere biologic functioning. Under these circumstances,
providers feel that it is just "wrong" to provide treatment. It is "bad medicine
...medicine being used for the wrong ends." 223 Moreover, they find it
gruesome, distressing, and demoralizing to provide treatment that is, on
balance, harmful to patients. 224
221 George J. Annas, Asking the Courts to Set the Standard of Emergency Care -
The Case of Baby K, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1542, 1545 (1994) (arguing for avoidance of
the scenario where "[p]hysicians will do whatever patients want (as long as they can pay
for it) because medicine will be seen as a consumer commodity like breakfast cereal and
toothpaste."); Tomlinson & Czlonka, supra note 172, at 29 ("[T]he value assumptions
made in cases of futility will have to receive their warrant from ...values for the
profession."). But see Eric Gampel, Does Professional Autonomy Protect Medical Futility
Judgments?, 20 BioETHics 92, 97 (2006) (arguing that while limits on patient autonomy
are set by the norms of the medical community rather than by individual providers, that
these limits do not extend to the futility context).
222 See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997);
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 416, 425 (Mass.
1977); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976); Ferguson, supra note 174, at 1239-
43 (noting that the UHCDA attempts to protect the ethical integrity of the medical
profession).
223 See Benjamin Weiser, Who Should Decide When Treatment Is Futile? In Many
Cases, Physicians Are Asking Whether Patient Autonomy Has Gone Too Far: The Case
of Baby Rena, WASH. POST, July 14, 1991, at A19 (quoting Dr. Murray Pollack).
224 See Burling, supra note 200; Burt, supra note 90, at 253; Hoffman, supra note
118, at F1 ("[D]oing CPR [to PVS and end-stage patients] felt not only pointless but like
I was administering blows to someone who had already had a hard enough life.")
(quoting Dr. Daniel Sulmasy); Terese Hudson & Kevin Lumsdon, Are Futile Care
Policies the Answer? Providers Struggle with Decisions for Patients Near the End of
Life, 68 HosPITALs & HEALTH NETWORKS, Feb. 20, 1994, at 26, 27; Rosenthal, supra
note 32, at B20 ("Doctors and nurses ... describe anger and anguish at being forced by a
patient or family to inflict pain on the dying, knowing that it is to no avail."); Liz
Kowalczyk, Mortal Differences Divide Hospital and Patient's Family, BOST. GLOBE,
Sept. 28, 2003, at Al (nurse refused to participate in continued aggressive treatment of
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2. Reducing Patient Suffering
A second reason to empower providers to resist inappropriate treatment
requests is out of concern for the patient. Continued interventions can be
inhumane, invasive, pointless, intrusive, cruel, burdensome, abusive,
degrading, obscene, violent, or grotesque. 225 CPR, for example, can be
painful, causing rib or sternal fractures in approximately 50% of cases. 226
Health care providers want to relieve patient suffering, not cause or prolong
it. 227
3. Avoiding False Hope
A third reason to empower providers to resist requests for inappropriate
treatment is to stop offering false hope. If providers act as though a medically
inappropriate option is "available," then that creates a psychological burden
Barbara Howe); Liz Kowalczyk, Hospital, Family Spar over End-of-Life Care, BOST.
GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2005, at Al ("Howe's longtime doctors and nurses believe ... that
keeping her alive is tantamount to torture."); Benjamin Weiser, The Case of Baby Rena:
While Child Suffered, Beliefs Clashed, WASH. POST, July 15, 1991, at Al (physicians and
nurses viewed every day that Baby Rena spent in the ICU as a "day of torture" and
"viewed themselves as the torturers"); ZUssMAN, supra note, 196, at 181. Cf TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 38 (5th ed.
2001) (defending the physician's right of "conscientious objection" where the patient
request is for something "medically unconscionable").
. 225 See, e.g., Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 328-29 (Iowa 1998) (doctor
unilaterally decided not to attempt CPR as "an act of mercy" because "I just can't do it to
her"); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Mass. App. 1978) (characterizing LSMT
as "pointless, even cruel, prolongation of the act of dying."); In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3, 4
(Ga. 1992) (hospital alleged continued treatment would constitute "medical abuse");
Nguyen v. Sacred Heart Med. Center, as reported in John Altomare & Mark Bolde, 11
ISSUES L. & MED. 199, 200 (1995) (hospital alleged continued treatment was
"inhumane"); Appellant Brief, In re Baby K, 1993 WL 13123742, at 3 ("This tragic case
involves a parent's attempt to require physicians to provide to a dying infant treatment
that is medically unreasonable, invasive, burdensome, inhumane, and inappropriate.");
Martha Kessler, Massachusetts Court Orders Hospital to Comply with Decisions Made
Under Health Proxy, 13 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 527, 2004 (Massachusetts General
Hospital successfully argued to a Boston court that CPR for Barbara Howe would be
"severe, invasive and harmful").
226 See generally Paul C. Sorum, Limiting CPR, 57 ALB. L. REv. 617, 618 (1994);
WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 81, at 94.
227 See Capron, supra note 119, at 24 (unilateral termination can avoid "mistreating
the patient"); WRONG MEDICINE, supra note 81, at 100-01.
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on surrogates to elect that option. 228 Naturally, surrogates want to take all
reasonable measures. By offering a particular intervention, the treating
physician suggests that the intervention is reasonable. It is unfair and
deceptive to offer the option of continuing care-thereby giving surrogates a
sense that the patient is making progress when, in fact, no progress is
possible.229
4. Rationalizing the Use of Scarce Resources
A fourth reason to empower providers to resist inappropriate treatment
requests is to maximize the utility of scarce resources. 230 We must be good
"stewards" of both "hard" resources like ICU beds and "soft" resources like
health care dollars. 23 1 As the population of elderly and ill rapidly grows, it is
becoming evident that there is just "not enough money to give everyone a
treatment with a one-in-a-million chance of success."'23 2
228 See, e.g., Annas, supra note 221, at 1543 (calling the provision of mechanical
ventilation'to Baby K after birth a "medical misjudgment" that gave the mother a false
impression); See Brett, supra note 198, at 281-82, 285 (2005). But cf Fletcher, supra
note 81, at S.224 (suggesting that the court documents in Baby K showed the physicians
had good reasons to intubate).
229 See Howard Brody, The Physician's Role in Determining Futility, 42 J. AM.
GERIATRIC Soc'Y 875, 876-77 (1994) (unethical to mislead patients by falsely raising
hopes); Hudson & Lumsdon, supra note 224, at 28 (John Popovich arguing that
physicians who offer meaningless care are "charlatans"); See Paris et al., supra note 118,
at 150; Tomlinson & Czlonka, supra note 172, at 28 (offering futile care is "a bogus
choice" and "a deception"); id. at 30 (arguing providers should seek "acceptance" rather
than "consent").
230 See Rosenthal, supra note 32, at B20 ("Doctors and nurses ... question whether
futile resuscitations, which can costs thousands of dollars and tie up precious intensive
care beds, makes sense in an era of rising health costs."). Cf. WRONG MEDICINE, supra
note 81, at 42 (cost for treating estimated 14-25,000 PVS patients between $1 and $7
billion per year); Leonard M. Fleck, Models of Rationing: A Democratic Decision
Making Approach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1611 (1992) (The care of Nancy Cruzan cost
nearly $1 million).
231 Cf Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for Non-Beneficial Medical Treatment,
325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 512, 514 (1991).
232 Julie Appleby, Debate Surrounds End-of-Life Health Care Costs, USA TODAY,
Oct. 19, 2006. See generally THE CENTER FOR THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL SCIENCES,
DARTMOUTH MEDICAL SCHOOL, THE CARE OF PATIENTS WITH SEVERE CHRONIC ILLNESS:
AN ONLINE REPORT ON THE MEDICARE PROGRAM BY THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS PROJECT
(2006); Jeremy Olson, Aggressive Care Often Extends Costs, Not Life, PIONEER. PRESS,
Nov. 12, 2006.
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5. Relieving the Burden of Decision
Finally, empowering providers to resist inappropriate treatment requests
may reduce the very scope of irreconcilability. Ensuring that each side has
some practical measure of independent authority and power to exert against
the other maximizes the likelihood that the parties will seriously engage with
the negotiating process.
Some feared that empowering the providers would be a conversation
stopper. 233 But the evidence suggests this has not happened. Instead,
provider empowerment prompts surrogates to seriously propose and weigh
compromise measures. Some surrogates, besieged by guilt and worry about
being disloyal, are not prepared to make this sort of momentous decision to
stop LSMT. But if someone else could make the decision, they are prepared
to acquiesce and relieve themselves of the burden of decision. 234
If we think that physicians should be able to declare some care off-limits,
then let's change the default rules and clarify that decisional authority. 235
Equalizing the power imbalance between surrogates and providers should
facilitate negotiation settlements by giving both sides concern about their
BATNA. "To the extent the judiciary [or legislature] can provide firmer
shadows, firmer predictions of legal results . . . mediated settlements will
more accurately reflect what a fair result should be." 236 Shoring up statutes
to give providers a real safe harbor creates greater normative clarity which, in
233 See, e.g., Dubler, Limiting Technology, supra note 72, at 298-99 ("[T]echniques
of mediation.., will be far more helpful than asserting and insisting on physician power
to decide-the essence of the futility discussion."); Prendergast et al., supra note 52, at
62.
234 See Fine, supra note 200, at 71; Fine, supra note 120, at 82 ("[Flamilies come to
understand that there is a finite limit . . . that they are not in total control of the
situation."); Fine et al., supra note 80, at 1221 ("[T]he family was relieved because they
had 'put up the good fight' . . . but now the decision was out of their hands."); Fine &
Mayo, supra note 80, at 746 ("[T]he greatest significance of the law is how it changes the
nature of the conversations.. . about futile treatment situations by providing conceptual
and temporal boundaries.").
235 See Burt, supra note 90, at 254 ("If negotiating a settlement.., it is important
for each party to the conflict to have a mutually recognized, independent source of
influence and authority to exert against the opposed party."); Dubler, supra note 77, at 11
(need "boundary setting, clear and directive management, and gutsy administration");
Schneiderman & Fein, supra note 90, at 11 ("Something in addition to process is
needed.").
236 Subrin, supra note 141, at 227.
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turn, gives providers greater bargaining power. 237
B. Mediation Can Work with Clear Safe Harbor and Equalized
Bargaining Power
There are two ways to shore up existing legislation to create a true safe
harbor for healthcare providers. The first way entails making more concrete
and precise the statutory standards that define provider authority to refuse
inappropriate treatment. The second approach abandons substantive
standards altogether and instead uses a purely process-based approach. 238
Consensus on precise substantive measures of medical inappropriateness
has proven unachievable. 239 Perhaps this should not be too surprising. In
very few areas of medicine do we find professional standards that are
"sufficiently mandatory and concrete" to operate as a safe harbor. 24° Rarely
do we have what is necessary for immunity, "a precise and plain statement of
the acceptable medical practice." 241 Instead, professional standards are
typically set ex post by "selectively drawn expert witness testimony." 242 If
we cannot achieve even professional consensus, we are even less likely to
achieve the broader social consensus necessary for legislation.
There exists no general understanding about what sort of life, what sort
of existence is worth the deployment of medical resources. We are
fundamentally at odds on the question of who gets to decide when enough is
enough. Because we are flummoxed by these questions, as a society we are
unable to come up with a "real" definition of "futile care." We are not yet
237 Cf Dubler, supra note 197, at 527 ("I think that this tipping to continued life and
a preference for medical interventions in situations of uncertainty is being challenged at
the moment."). Unilateral treatment termination laws allow providers to end a provider-
patient relationship just as "unilateral divorce allows marriages to end where one person
wants out of the marriage but the other person wants to remain married." Cf Betsey
Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and
Family Distress, 121 Q. J. ECON. 267, 268 (2006).
238 Cf Calfee & Craswell, supra note 201, at 999-1000.
239 See supra notes 172 and 176.
240 See Hall, supra note 146, at 121, 127-28, 144-45.
241 Id. at 134.
242 Blumstein, supra note 186, at 1028. Cf Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075, 1076
(noting that while the statute permits providers to decline "medically inappropriate"
treatment, "[u]nfortunately, medically inappropriate and medical judgment are not
defined." Consequently, the case had to go to a "medical review panel" to determine the
standard of care).
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prepared to specify the proper ends of medicine, the acceptable criteria for
rationing, or the legitimate restrictions on patient autonomy.
Given this absence of consensus on substantive norms, a more, promising
approach is a pure process mechanism. 243 As Carrie Menkel-Meadow
observes, "even if we cannot all agree on substantive norms and goals, we
can probably [at least] agree on some processes for making decisions that
will enable us to go forward and act." 244
The Texas Advance Directives Act (TADA) is an example of Professor
Menkel-Meadow's pure process mechanism. It abandons all effort to define
the circumstances under which a provider may make a unilateral decision. In
contrast to the approach in other states, the Texas Act makes no reference to
health care standards, only to procedures. When a provider refuses to honor a
surrogate's request for continued LSMT, the provider must commence a
multi-stage review process. LSMT must be provided during this review
process. 245
The first stage entails an ethics committee's review of the attending
physician's determination. The surrogate must be notified of the ethics
committee review process at least forty-eight hours before the committee
meets. 246 The surrogate is also entitled to attend the meeting and to receive a
written explanation of the committee's decision. 247
If the ethics committee agrees that LSMT is inappropriate, the provider is
obligated to continue to provide LSMT for ten days after the surrogate is
given the ethics committee's written decision. 248 During this time, the
provider must attempt to transfer the patient to another provider that is
willing to comply with the surrogate's treatment request. 249 If the patient has
243 Cf. Burt, supra note 90, at 249 (noting the retreat from "hard principles" to a
"soft process"). Dubler and Liebman write that "[w]hen mediation does not result in an
agreement, it is ...most likely, an indicator that another process is better suited to
resolving the dispute." DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 13.
244 CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, DISPUTE PROCESSING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY xiii (2003) (citing STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE AS
CONFLICT (2000)). See also Burt, supra note 90, at 253 ("The absence of hard resolving
principle shifts our attention to the interactive processes ... negotiated settlement").
245 TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(a) (2007) (ethics or medical review
committee).
246 Id. § 166.046(b)(2).
247 Id. § 166.046(b)(4)(B). The surrogate is also entitled to a copy of a registry with
the name of providers willing to accept the patient upon transfer. Id. § 166.046(b)(3)(B).
248 Id. § 166.046(e). A court may extend this time period only if "there is a
reasonable expectation" that a transfer can be made. Id. § 166.046(g).
249 TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(d). Transfer is unlikely. See Pope,
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not been transferred, then the provider may unilaterally stop LSMT on the
eleventh day. 250
When the TADA first went to Governor Bush in 1997, he vetoed the bill
because it "eliminates the objective negligence standard for reviewing
whether a physician properly discontinued the use of life-sustaining
procedures." 251 But this was precisely the point, as reflected in the 1999
legislation that Bush did sign:
[A] physician, health care professional acting under the direction of a
physician, or health care facility is not civilly or criminally liable or subject
to disciplinary action by the person's appropriate licensing board if that
person has complied with the procedures outlined in Section 166.046.252
Unlike the UHCDA and other unilateral decision statutes which specify
vague substantive standards such as "significant benefit," the safe harbor of
TADA is defined solely in terms of process. 253
Texas providers who follow TADA's prescribed notice and meeting
procedures are immune from disciplinary action and civil and criminal
liability. 254 Since the statute's requirements are concrete and measurable,
there is little, if any, uncertainty of compliance. Consequently, providers are
empowered to stand up to surrogate demands. 255
Futility Statutes, supra note 10.
250 See Pope, supra note 10 ("The physician and the health care facility are not
obligated to provide life-sustaining treatment after the 10th day after the written
decision.").
251 Tex. Legis. J. 4928 (June 20, 1997), vetoing Tex. S.B. 414, 76th Leg. (1997). See
also Interim Report, supra note 56, at 33-34.
252 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.045(d) (emphasis added).
253 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(g). See also Nikolouzos v. St. Luke's
Episcopal Hosp., 162 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Tex. App. 2005) (finding medical evidence
"irrelevant" since the "hospital's ethics committee has determined the care is
inappropriate."); Interim Report, supra note 56, at 35 ("The court considers whether
another provider who will honor the patient's directive is likely to be found; it does not
address the issue of whether the decision to withdraw life support is valid.") (emphasis
added); Iliana L. Peters, Perspectives on the Texas Medical Futility Statute as Amended
in 2003, HEALTH LAW. WKLY, Oct. 22, 2004 ("Importantly, the statute does not attempt
to define 'medical futility.' Any attempt to do so might result in a definition that is either
too broad or too narrow.").
254 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.045(d).
255 See Ramshaw, supra note 15 (study of sixteen Texas hospitals over five years
found that, on average, each hospital had made the decision to unilaterally stop treatment
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The TADA is far from perfect. Ten days may not be a reasonable or
sufficient time for surrogates to locate an alternative facility willing to accept
the patient.256 It may violate procedural due process to place the ultimate
decision in the hands of an institutional ethics committee comprised of
physicians and administrators who look to the hospital for their economic
livelihood.257 But these mechanics of the TADA process can be and are
being refined. 258 A pure process approach works. And such an approach does
and should serve as a model for other states. 259
VI. CONCLUSION
Mediation has proved remarkably useful in resolving some end-of-life
disputes. We should recognize that success, and equip health care institutions
accordingly. But we must also attend to the limits of mediation's abilities.
Since it cannot resolve the significant and growing set of intractable futility
disputes, we must address the substantive norms to empower providers to
resist inappropriate treatment requests.
at least once each year); Robert D. Truog & Christine Mitchell, Futility-From Hospital
Policies to State Laws, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 19, 20 (2006). ("Clinicians in Texas may also
be much more confident and bold in applying the policy, knowing that they are protected
by the law."). Texas' unilateral decision statute appears to have had a significant impact.
In one study at Baylor University Medical Center (in Dallas), the authors found that the
law gave physicians "more comfort," thereby increasing ethical consultations regarding
futility disputes by 67%. Fine & Mayo, supra note 82, at 745.
.256 Hearing on S.B. 439 Before the Senate Committee on Health and Human
Services, 80th Leg. (Tex. Apr. 12, 2007).
257 Id. see also Robert D. Truog, Tackling Medical Futility in Texas, 357 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 2 (2007); Hearing on Advance Directives Before the House Committee on Public
Health, 80th Leg. (Tex. Apr. 25, 2007).
258 See, e.g., Tex. S.B. 439, 80th Leg. (2007).
259 See, e.g., Arthur E. Kopelman et al., The Benefits of a North Carolina Policy for
Determining Inappropriate or Futile Medical Care, 66 N.C. MED. J. 392 (2005);
Wisconsin Medical Society, Resolution 1 - 2004,
www.wisconsinmedicalsociety.org/member-resources/gov/res04-l.cfm (last visited Nov.
1, 2007).
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